Apr
2
Sat
Columbia Workshop on Group Agency and Social Epistemology @ Philosophy Hall, rm 716
Apr 2 all-day

Main speakers:

Philip Kitcher, Columbia University
Cailin O, University of California, Irvine
Gregory Wheeler, MCMP, LMU Munich
Kevin Zollman, Carnegie Mellon University

Organisers:

Michael Nielsen, Columbia University
Ignacio Ojea Quintana, Columbia University
Rush Stewart, Columbia University

Details

Philip Kitcher

Social Agnotology

Agnotology stands to ignorance as epistemology stands to knowledge.  This talk will be focused on social mechanisms that sustain ignorance. Some forms of ignorance are fruitful. Most are not. I begin with some distinctions.  Those distinctions are then used to consider particularly noxious (and live) forms of contemporary ignorance: specifically, kinds of ignorance that persist in spite of knowledgeable people within the community, and that endure because those who remain ignorant cannot tell who is expert with respect to an important debated issue (example – confusions about anthropocentric climate change).  I argue that the intellectual credit economy, useful in sustaining valuable diversity within the scientific community, interacts with other valuable social conditions (wide recognition that scientists should inform the general public) to erode the markers of epistemic authority on which all of us depend.

Cailin O’Connor

Power, Bargaining, and Evolution

Nash famously showed that power differences across players in game theoretic models can translate into advantages in bargaining scenarios. In this talk, I discuss joint work with Justin Bruner where we explore how power, hashed out in several different ways, can lead to bargaining advantage in evolving social populations. I show how these models can inform the emergence of norms of collaboration across hierarchies in academia, and other bargaining norms in populations with more and less powerful groups.

Gregory Wheeler

Mispriced gambles: What peers learn when they disagree

The Preservation of Irrelevant Evidence (PIE) Principle maintains that a resolution strategy to peer disagreements should be able to preserve unanimous judgments of evidential irrelevance among the peers. It is well-known that no standard Bayesian resolution strategy satisfies the PIE Principle, and some — such as Carl Wagner — have argued so much the worse for PIE. In this paper we respond by giving a loss aversion argument in support of PIE and against Bayes. Another response is for each peer to dig in her heels and remain ‘steadfast’ or cave-in to a single dictator. Thomas Kelly advocates the former approach and nobody, so far as I know, the latter. In any case, we respond by arguing that a disagreement introduces to the peers the serious possibility that they may have mispriced the random quantities in dispute. The theory of imprecise probability offers tools to clear up these matters, but it also uncovers new issues that are unfamiliar to standard probabilistic modelings for a single agent. Thus, we introduce the notion of a set-based credal judgment to frame and address some of that subtleties that arise in peer disagreements.

Kevin Zollman

The credit economy and the economic rationality of science

Scientists are motivated by the credit they are given for their discoveries by their peers. Traditional theories of the scientific method in philosophy do not include this motivation, and at first blush it appears as though these theories would regard it as inappropriate. A number of scholars have suggested, however, that this motivation serves to perpetuate successful science. It has been proposed as a mechanism to encourage more scientific effort and a mechanism to effectively allocate resources between competing research programs. This paper presents an economic model of scientists’ choices in which these claims can be formalized and evaluated. Ultimately, the paper comes to mixed conclusions. The motivation for credit may help to increase scientists effort in science, but also may serve to misallocate effort between competing research programs.

Apr
28
Thu
Latinx Philosophers Conference @ 716 Philosophy Hall, Columbia U.
Apr 28 – Apr 29 all-day

The 1st Latinx Philosophers Conference is an initiative of some Latin American PhD candidates in the Columbia Philosophy Department. We hope to initiate a tradition of annual conferences to serve the following ends. First, to foster the creation and development of a Latinx Philosophers Network in the United States. This network, in turn, will help us provide a space for camaraderie and collaborative work, as well as identify and pursue the common interests of Latinx Philosophers in the U.S. Second, to provide a space for discussing issues of particular relevance to Latinx from a philosophical perspective.

The conference will take place on April 29-30 and will be organized around two clusters of topics. The first day will be devoted to issues in Epistemology, Logic, Metaphysics and Philosophy of Science. The second day will focus on Ethics, Social and Political Philosophy, Feminist Philosophy, Philosophy of Race, and Latin American Philosophy. We are happy to announce that Otavio Bueno and Jorge Gracia will be our keynote speakers for each day, respectively.

We invite graduate students who identify as Latinx or who are interested in forming part of the Latino/a Philosophers Network to submit papers on any of the topics mentioned above. We encourage submissions by women. We also encourage submissions that discuss issues relevant to the Latinx experience.

Papers should not exceed 4000 words (or the equivalent of a 30-minute presentation). They should be prepared for blind review and sent as a PDF file to latinophilosophersnetwork@gmail.com. In a separate PDF attachment, please include your name, academic affiliation, email address, telephone number, paper title, and an abstract of no more than 250 words. Any questions can be directed to César Cabezas (cgc2125@columbia.edu), or Ignacio Ojea (ignacio.ojea@columbia.edu). Acceptances will be announced by March 15.

This event is supported by:

MAP (Minorities and Philosophy), and

The Center for Race, Philosophy and Social Justice at Columbia University

Sep
22
Thu
Transphilosophies: the Migration of Ideas and the Decolonization of Knowledge @ Maison Française East Gallery, Buell Hall, Columbia
Sep 22 @ 6:00 pm – 8:30 pm

Transphilosophies: the Migration of Ideas and the Decolonization of Knowledge

Seloua Luste Boulbina, Etienne Balibar, Ali Benmaklouf, Souleymane Bachir Diagne, moderated by Madeleine Dobie

Table ronde en français / Roundtable in French.

This event is featured as part of a series of events on “Le français dans tous ses états,” with sponsorship provided by the Cultural Services of the French Embassy in the U.S.

Tracing the migration of ideas—between countries and among theoretical and artistic practices—is an important dimension of the decolonization of knowledge. How do ideas cross borders? If translation is one route, ideas also circulate within linguistic areas, for example between former colonial powers and colonized countries. If western thought is widely disseminated throughout the world, what movements are occurring in other directions, for instance in the exchanges between contemporary art, philosophy and history? In this cross-disciplinary roundtable, five leading thinkers share their perspectives on the movement of ideas across media, disciplines, languages, and regions, considering how art and philosophy come together in the decolonization of knowledge. The discussion will be preceded by screenings of four recent short films that explore the politics of decolonization in an experimental visual language: Le Voyage à Bandung (Jean-François Boclé, 2015, 5 min.); Corps à corps (Louisa Babari and Celio Paillard, 2015, 8 min.); The Storyteller (Katia Kameli, 2012, 12 min.); Kaleta Kaleta (Emo de Medeiros, 2015, 6 min.).

“Transphilosophies” entend développer une politique de la relation. En ouvrant un espace partagé de réflexion élargie, l’intention est de produire du commun. Transphilosophies est conçu comme une rencontre entre approches visuelles et discursives à des questions partagées. L’image et la fiction entretiennent des liens étroits avec les mots et l’analyse qu’il convient d’explorer. La migration des idées, entre les pays, entre les pratiques – théoriques et artistiques – permet de mieux appréhender les enjeux et les objets de la décolonisation  des savoirs. Comment les passages de frontières s’effectuent-ils ? La traduction est bien sûr une voie à interroger. Mais elle ne suffit pas à rendre compte des constantes remarquables qui permettent de passer, intercontinentalement, d’un monde à l’autre. Qu’en est-il lorsque l’on se trouve dans la même aire linguistique et que les idées circulent entre anciennes puissances impériales et anciens pays colonisés ? Si la pensée occidentale est particulièrement bien diffusée à travers le monde, qu’en est-il dans l’autre sens ? La porosité entre les champs – entre art contemporain, philosophie contemporaine et histoire – ouvre la porte à de nouveaux voisinages qu’il faut également examiner.

Participants:

Seloua Luste Boulbina est Agrégée de philosophie, docteur en sciences politiques, directrice de programme au Collège International de philosophie à Paris (« La décolonisation des savoirs ») et chercheuse (HDR) au LCSP (EA7335) à l’Université Diderot Paris 7. Théoricienne de la décolonisation, elle s’intéresse aux questions coloniales et postcoloniales, dans leurs dimensions politiques, intellectuelles et artistiques. Son dernier livre est L’Afrique et ses fantômes, Écrire l’après (Présence Africaine, 2015).

Souleymane Bachir Diagne is Professor of Philosophy and French and Chair of the Department of French at Columbia University. Previously he taught philosophy for many years at Cheikh Anta Diop University, Dakar (Senegal) and at Northwestern University. His field of research includes history of logic, history of philosophy, Islamic philosophy, African philosophy and literature. One of his recent books, Bergson postcolonial. L’élan vital dans la pensée de Senghor et de Mohamed Iqbal, Paris, Editions du CNRS, 2011) was awarded the Dagnan-Bouveret prize by the French Academy of Moral and Political Sciences for 2011 and he received the Edouard Glissant Prize for his work in 2011.

Etienne Balibar is Visiting Professor at Columbia in the Department of French and Institute for Comparative Literature and Society.  He is Professor Emeritus of moral and political philosophy at Université de Paris X – Nanterre and Distinguished Professor of Humanities at the University of California, Irvine. He has published widely in the area of Marxist philosophy and moral and political philosophy in general. His many works include Lire le Capital (with Louis Althusser, Pierre Macherey, Jacques Rancière, Roger Establet, and F. Maspero) (1965);Spinoza et la politique (1985); Nous, citoyens d’Europe? Les frontières, l’État, le peuple(2001); Politics and the Other Scene (2002); L’Europe, l’Amérique, la Guerre. Réflexions sur la mediationeuropéenne (2003);  Europe, Constitution, Frontière (2005).

To RSVP, please click here.

Oct
28
Fri
Epistemology After Sextus Empiricus @ Columbia Philosophy Dept.
Oct 28 – Oct 29 all-day

A book project* and two conferances at Columbia University and UC Berkeley
Justin Vlasits (UC Berkeley), Katja Maria Vogt (Columbia University)

Meeting I
Commentators-at-large: Lorenzo Corti (Université de Lorraine), Melissa Fusco (Columbia University), Christiana Olfert (Tufts University), Simon Shogry (Princeton University), Justin Vlasits (UC Berkeley)

 

Friday October 28, Columbia University
Session 1: 4:00-5:30 (with coffee/etc. available at the start)
Don Garrett (NYU)
Hume on Belief, Causation, and Pyrrhonism
Session 2: 5:30-7pm
Kathryn Tabb (Columbia University)
Locke, Pyrrhonist Medicine, and the Ethics of Belief
Conference dinner for speakers and commentators

Saturday October 29, Columbia University
Session 3: 9:30-11 (with coffee/etc. available at the start)
MGF Martin (University College London/UC Berkeley)
Variation and Change in Appearances
Session 4: 11-12:30
Kathrin Glüer-Pagin (University of Stockholm)
Illusory Looks
Lunch 12:30-1:30
Session 5: 1:30-3
John Morrison (Barnard College/Columbia University)
Perceptual Relativism: Ancient and Contemporary
Session 6: 3-4:30 (with coffee/etc. available at the start)
Susanna Schellenberg (Rutgers University, New Brunswick)
Internalism and Knowledge First
Session 7: 4:30-6
Peter Pagin (University of Stockholm)
Forceless Attributions

Dec
12
Mon
The Transmission of Knowledge: Tool Use and Cognition – Seminars in Society and Neuroscience @ Faculty House, Columbia U
Dec 12 @ 4:00 pm – 6:00 pm

Speakers:
Nicola Clayton, PhD, Professor of Comparative Cognition, Cambridge University

Additional speakers forthcoming.

 

This event is free and open to the public. Reception to follow.

This event is part of the Presidential Scholars in Society and Neuroscience, Seminars in Society and Neuroscience series.

Mar
4
Sat
Symposium on Visual Intelligence @ Columbia U.
Mar 4 all-day

We are pleased to announce the second symposium at Columbia University, Saturday, March 4, 2017,

Keynote Speakers:

Dr. John Morrison, Department of Philosophy at Columbia University/Barnard College

Professor Morrison is currently working on three projects.   The first is about how we manage to perceive secondary qualities, such as redness. He argues that we perceive them in virtue of perceiving the differences and similarities between objects, thereby reversing the traditional order of explanation.  He then develops similar explanations of how we perceive objects, kinds, and many primary qualities.  The second is about uncertainty and perception. He argues that our perceptual experiences sometimes assign degrees of confidence. Both of these projects draw heavily on empirical psychology, particularly psychophysics and cognitive psychology. The third project is about the foundations of Spinoza’s metaphysics. He hopes to unravel Spinoza’s claims about minds, bodies, God, and their essences.

Dr. Alexander Todorov, Department of Psychology at Princeton University

The primary focus of research in Professor Alexander’s lab is on the cognitive and neural mechanisms of social perception and social cognition with a particular emphasis on the social dimensions of face perception. Our approach is multidisciplinary. He uses a variety of methods from behavioral and functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging (fMRI) experiments to computational modeling. The span of our research ranges from the social consequences of rapid, initial person impressions to the basic neural mechanisms underlying such impressions. Current major areas of research include computational modeling of social perception of faces, identifying brain networks involved in representing other people, and mechanisms of updating person representations.

Topic:  What is a cognitive understanding of visual intelligence?

Keywords: analytic philosophy, fine art, intelligence, logic, artificial intelligence, data science & mining, philosophy of mind, epistemology, philosophy of language, grammar, philosophy of games, visual studies, aesthetics, art history & criticism, psychology, philosophy of science.

Call for Papers:

We would consider papers with parameters of the following:
Philosophy of language, logic, artificial intelligence, aesthetics, analytic philosophy, philosophy of psychology, psychology, visual studies, philosophy of science, data science, philosophy of mind, art history & criticism

Submission deadline: Fri, February 10, 2017. Accepted submissions will be announced before Feb 17.

Length: 500 – 1000 words

How to submit: Please email PDF files to insvi [at] insvi.org
or upload your files at http://insvi.org/submission

https://philevents.org/event/show/29406

Mar
24
Fri
An Epistemic Generalization of Rationalizability – Rohit Parikh @ Faculty House, Columbia U
Mar 24 @ 4:10 pm

Rationalizability, originally proposed by Bernheim and Pearce, generalizes the notion of Nash equilibrium. Nash equilibrium requires common knowledge of strategies. Rationalizability only requires common knowledge of rationality. However, their original notion assumes that the payoffs are common knowledge. I.e. agents do know what world they are in, but may be ignorant of what other agents are playing.

We generalize the original notion of rationalizability to consider situations where agents do not know what world they are in, or where some know but others do not know. Agents who know something about the world can take advantage of their superior knowledge. It may also happen that both Ann and Bob know about the world but Ann does not know that Bob knows. How might they act?

We will show how a notion of rationalizability in the context of partial knowledge, represented by a Kripke structure, can be developed.

Dec
8
Fri
The Price of Broadminded Probabilities and the Limitation of Science – Haim Gaifman (Columbia) @ Faculty House, Columbia U
Dec 8 @ 4:10 pm

A subjective probability function is broadminded to the extent that it assigns positive probabilities to conjectures that can be possibly true. Assigning to such a conjecture the value 0 amounts to a priori ruling out the possibility of confirming the conjecture to any extent by the growing evidence. A positive value leaves, in principle, the possibility of learning from the evidence. In general, broadmindedness is not an absolute notion, but a graded one, and there is a price for it: the more broadminded the probability, the more complicated it is, because it has to assign non-zero values to more complicated conjectures. The framework which is suggested in the old Gaifman-Snir paper is suitable for phrasing this claim in a precise way and proving it. The technique by which this claim is established is to assume a definable probability function, and to state within the same language a conjecture that can be possibly true, whose probability is 0.

The complexity of the conjecture depends on the complexity of the probability, i.e., the complexity of the formulas that are used in defining it. In the Gaifman-Snir paper we used the arithmetical hierarchy as a measure of complexity. It is possible however to establish similar results with respect to a more “down to earth” measures, defined in terms of the time that it takes to calculate the probabilities, with given precisions.

A claim of this form, for a rather simple setup, was first proven by Hilary Putnam in his paper ““Degree of Confirmation” and inductive logic”, which was published in the 1963 Schilpp volume dedicated to Carnap. The proof uses in a probabilistic context, a diagonalization technique, of the kind used in set theory and in computer science. In the talk I shall present Putnam’s argument and show how diagonalization can be applied in considerably richer setups.

The second part of the talk is rather speculative. I shall point out the possibility that there might be epistemic limitations to what human science can achieve, which are imposed by certain pragmatic factors ‒ such as the criterion of repeatable experiments. All of which would recommend a skeptic attitude.

Mar
3
Sat
Recent Work in Decision Theory and Epistemology Workshop @ Philosophy Hall rm 716
Mar 3 all-day

Speakers:

Jennifer Carr (University of California, San Diego)
Ryan Doody (Hebrew University of Jerusalem)
Harvey Lederman (Princeton University)
Chris Meacham (University of Massachusetts, Amherst)

Organizer:

Melissa Fusco (Columbia University)

9:30 – 10:00 Breakfast (716 Philosophy Hall)
SESSION I Chair: Melissa Fusco
10:00 – 11:30 Jennifer Carr: “Can Accuracy Motivate Modesty?”
11:30 – 11:45 Coffee Break I
SESSION II Chair: Jessica John Collins
11:45 – 1:15 Ryan Doody: “Hard Choices Made Harder”
1:15 – 2:30 Lunch
SESSION III Chair: Jennifer Carr
2:30 – 4:00 Harvey Lederman: “Verbalism”
4:00 – 4:30 Coffee Break II
SESSION IV Chair: Ryan Doody
4:30 – 6:00 Chris Meacham: “Decision in Cases of Infinitely Many Utility Contributions”
6:00 Drinks
Nov
29
Thu
Technê as Productive Knowledge for Aristotle, Simona Aimar (UCL) @ Columbia University Philosophy Dept. 716
Nov 29 @ 4:10 pm – 6:00 pm

Reception to follow