JOSHUA MASON (West Chester University of Pennsylvania)
“Cognitive Linguistics and Cultural Gulfs: From Embodied Metaphors to Responsible Generalizations”
An ongoing debate in comparative research is about whether we should see cultural diversities as manifestations of essential differences or as superficial variations on a universal blueprint. Edward Slingerland has pointed to cognitive linguistics and the use of embodied metaphors to emphasize the universality of concept formation and cognition across cultures. He suggests that this should quiet the “cultural essentialists” who take fundamental differences in eastern and western thinking as their starting points. Michael Puett has also leveled a critique of cultural essentialism in support of a presuppositionless approach, and Slingerland’s conclusions seem to offer him support. However, I will argue that even if all modern humans are broadly similar in metaphor use and cognitive processes, research in the humanities must continue to account for the differences implied by the particular metaphors employed and emphasized in diverse traditions. I contend that responsible hermeneutic practice does this through provisional, yet indispensable, generalizations. A starting point which recognizes the existence of cultural gulfs will facilitate, not vitiate, future advances in cross-cultural understanding.
We are excited to share with you our upcoming lineup of speakers:
February 26: Joshua Mason (West Chester University)
March 18: Harvey Lederman (NYU)
April 8: Shigenori Nagatomo (Temple University)
April 29: Sara McClintock (Emory University)
We will provide more information regarding the topic of each speaker’s
presentation as the semester progresses. We hope to see you all at what
promises to be a semester of discussion and engagement.
We are excited to share with you our upcoming lineup of speakers:
February 26: Joshua Mason (West Chester University)
March 18: Harvey Lederman (NYU)
April 8: Shigenori Nagatomo (Temple University)
April 29: Sara McClintock (Emory University)
We will provide more information regarding the topic of each speaker’s
presentation as the semester progresses. We hope to see you all at what
promises to be a semester of discussion and engagement.
SHIGENORI NAGATOMO (Temple University)
With responses from:
GRAHAM PRIEST (CUNY Graduate Center)
Please join us at Columbia University’s Religion Department on FRIDAY, APRIL 8th at 5:30PM for his lecture entitled:
“The Logic of Not: An Invitation to an Holistic Mode of Thinking”
This presentation extends an invitation to an holistic mode of understanding to those who are concerned with current global situations. It thematically deals with the logic that appears in the sutra called the Diamond Sutra which belongs to the prajñāpāaramitā literature of Mahayana Buddhism. This logic is called “logic of not” because a negation appears in the formulation of the idea of identity as is expressed in the following: “A is not A, therefore it is A.” This logic cuts against the grain of the assumptions which the mode of thinking predominant in the Western philosophical tradition accepts as its modus operandi, namely the conceptual paradigm of the “either-or ego-logical dualistic standpoint.” This presentation argues that this paradigm generates a problem of fragmentation, which we take to be the root of many of the problems we face today, by analyzing the phrases such as “either-or,” “dualistic” and “ego-logical.” It then turns to an analysis of “the logic of not” by showing how it differs from Aristotle’s logic, while providing the philosophical reasons why the Diamond Sutra formulates its understanding of reality in terms of “the logic of not.” With this clarification, the presentation discusses how a transparency of mind and the idea of interdependency are necessary for achieving an holistic perspective, i.e., to understand things holistically. This mode of thinking will be effective to correct the problem of fragmentation, for example, in dealing with such topics as I knowing myself, the I-thou relationship, and environmental concerns.
…
April 29: Sara McClintock (Emory University)
We will provide more information regarding the topic of each speaker’s
presentation as the semester progresses. We hope to see you all at what
promises to be a semester of discussion and engagement.
THE COLUMBIA SOCIETY FOR COMPARATIVE PHILOSOPHY
Welcomes:
SARA MCCLINTOCK (Emory University)
With responses from:
THOMAS A. LEWIS (Brown University)
Please join us at Columbia University’s Religion Department on FRIDAY, APRIL 29th at 5:30PM for her lecture entitled:
“Rehabilitating the Conventional via the Transactional: An Experiment in Madhyamaka Thought Inspired by Kamalaśīla”
Madhyamaka Buddhist philosophy is renowned for its theory of two truths (satya-dvaya), typically represented in English as conventional truth (saṃvṛti-satya) and ultimate truth (paramārtha-satya). The ultimate truth is that all things are empty (śūnya) of any intrinsic nature (svabhāva), while the conventional truth refers to the misleading yet nevertheless useful “truths” according to which people function in the world. Nāgārjuna, the father of Madhyamaka thought, famously explains that without relying on the conventional truth, the ultimate truth cannot be revealed. Scholarly work on Madhyamaka has long shown a fascination with emptiness, the ultimate truth, while interest in the conventional truth has been comparatively meager. This is starting to change. In a recent volume, a collective of scholars calling themselves the Cowherds has argued for the importance of conventional truth and for the need both to take it seriously and to get it right. In this paper, I offer a new way of thinking about conventional truth inspired by my reading of the works of Kamalaśīla, an eighth-century Madhyamaka polymath, who is known for taking conventional truth extremely seriously. In this talk, I will consider some elements of Kamalaśīla’s approach to conventional truth, arguing that, along with his teacher Śāntarakṣita, he offers tools for rehabilitating the conventional through an emphasis on the complex material, discursive, and ideational transactions (vyavahāra) that together create the conditions for truth. Considering Kamalaśīla’s approach to the problem of intrinsic nature (svabhāva) for the production of conventional truth, I show that for Kamalaśīla such truth is best understood as deeply transactional in nature. Shifting from a discourse of truth to one of reality, we see that conventional truth is itself a transactional reality, and as such can never be stable but must constantly arise anew. I close with some reflections on how Kamalaśīla’s transactional approach to the conventional may offer Madhyamaka greater potential for interchange with science (via enactive theories of cognition for example) and philosophy (via the theories of thinkers like Dewey and Foucault). Whether Kamalaśīla gets the conventional right or not, my goal in this talk is to begin to reveal his perspective as an alternate to the more typical theories of the conventional truth—theories that generally ignore the non-discursive conditions of conventional truth—in current Madhyamaka scholarship.
FRIDAY, APRIL 29
5:30-7:30 pm
Rm. 101, 80 Claremont Ave, Columbia University
PLEASE VISIT OUR WEBSITE:
The new season of Brooklyn Public Philosophers is upon us! Ask a Philosopher is coming back in a big way, and we have some, dare I say, dope af talks lined up for the semester – Elvira Basevich on W.E.B. Du Bois and the metaphysics of race, Christia Mercer on women in the history of philosophy, Chris Lebron on the philosophy of Black Lives Matter. Coming up on February 23rd at 7:00 P.M., Ben Abelson (Mercy College) will be kicking things off with a talk on what science fiction can teach us about what it means to be a person (human or otherwise). Here’s more about the talk, in Dr. Abelson’s own words:
“Persons in Science Fiction”
There is a crucial distinction between the concepts “human” and “person”. To be a person, one need not be a member of the human species. Science fiction is filled with a variety of non-human persons, including artificially intelligent robots, intergalactic aliens, super-evolved animals, and more. But what are the qualities that are essential to something counting as a person? This talk will examine the nature of personhood by considering myriad examples from sci-fi literature and film.
As usual, we meet at the Dweck Center at the Grand Army Plaza branch of the Brooklyn Public Library. Bring a date! Or at least bring a sci-fi nerd! Come prepared with your favorite example of a marginal case of a person!
See you there, I hope!
Upcoming events:
3/23 – Elvira Basevich, “W.E.B. Du Bois’s Racialism and Two Liberal Conceptions of Plurality” @ the Dweck Center // 7:00 P.M.
4/27 – Christia Mercer on women in the history of philosophy @ the Dweck Center // 7:00 P.M.
5/18 – Chris Lebron on the philosophy of Black Lives Matter @ the Dweck Center // 7:00 P.M.
April 25, Saray Alaya-Lopez (Cal. State, Sacramento), “Agency in Structural Explanations of Injustice.” 6:30-8:00pm, CUNY Graduate Center 5414.
May 23, Karen Jones (U. Melbourne), “Radical Consciousness and Epistemic Privilege.” 6:30-8:00pm, CUNY Graduate Center 5414.
I’ve argued that the Indian Buddhist tradition, broadly construed, has tended to endorse a unique view of freedom and responsibility, a view I’ve called Buddhist Perspectivalism. According to this view, we should always regard ourselves as genuinely free and responsible agents, because we have good reason to do so, while we should never regard others in this way, because we have equally good reason to see them as neither free nor responsible. In this talk, I clarify Buddhist Perspectivalism as a theory of moral responsibility and defend it against some concerns that scholars like Christopher Gowans and Charles Goodman have raised.
With a response from:
Rick Repetti (Kingsborough Community College, CUNY)
Columbia Society for Comparative Philosophy:
Oct. 6: Jake Davis (New York University)
Nov. 3: Daniel Breyer (Illinois State University)
Dec. 8: Nico Silins (Cornell University) and Susanna Siegel (Harvard University)
People feel on occasion that life should be embraced in a certain way. You only live once, carpe diem, #YOLO: we commonly associate the thought of our limited lives with the thought that we should take adventures, risks, or break with our routines and norms. But how, if at all, does the thought that you only live once motivate adventurous, risky, or unusual behavior? After all, having only one life seems to equally well motivate the exact opposite of adventure and risk. I consider several ways of supporting the thought that life should be embraced. All are found wanting, except one.
Join us for an evening of accessible philosophical thought and erudite fun. Former pro skater and USD philosophy professor Nick Riggle’s debut title, On Being Awesome: A Unified Theory of How Not to Suck draws on pop culture, politics, history, and sports to to illuminate the ethics and culture of awesomeness and pinpoint its origins in America. Philosopher Aaron James (UC Irvine), a longtime globetrotting surfer and author of the bestselling Assholes: A Theory, returns with Surfing with Sartre: An Aquatic Inquiry Into a Life of Meaning, using the experience and the ethos of surfing to explore key concepts in philosophy. Join Nick and Aaron in conversation followed by a reception and book signing.
In Philosophy in the Library, philosophers from around the world tackle the big questions. In February, we hear from Ethan Hallerman.
None of us today can avoid reflecting on the way our thoughts and habits relate to the tools we use, but interest in how technologies reshape us is both older and broader than contemporary concerns around privacy, distraction, addiction, and isolation. For the past hundred years, scholars have investigated the historical role of everyday technologies in making new forms of experience and senses of selfhood possible, from at least as early as the invention of writing. In recent years, philosophers have considered how our understanding of agency and mental states should be revised in light of the role that the technical environment plays in our basic activities. Here, we will look at how some models of the mind illuminate the results of the philosophy of technology to clarify the relationship between technology and the self.
Ethan Hallerman is a doctoral student in philosophy at Stony Brook University. He lives in New York where he prowls the sewers at night, looking for his father.