Bridges 2014: Philosophical Exchange on Inter-Theoretical Relations
(New York, September 2 – 3, 2014)
“Bridges 2014″ will take place in the German House, New York City, on 2 and 3 September, 2014. The 2-day trans-continental meeting in mathematical philosophy will focus on inter-theoretical relations thereby connecting form and content of this philosophical exchange.
Idea and Motivation
We use theories to explain, to predict and to instruct, to talk about our world and order the objects therein. Different theories deliberately emphasize different aspects of an object, purposefully utilize different formal methods, and necessarily confine their attention to a distinct field of interest. The desire to enlarge knowledge by combining two theories presents a research community with the task of building bridges between the structures and theoretical entities on both sides. Especially if no background theory is available as yet, this becomes a question of principle and of philosophical groundwork: If there are any – what are the inter-theoretical relations to look like? Will a unified theory possibly adjudicate between monist and dualist positions? Under what circumstances will partial translations suffice? Can the ontological status of inter-theoretical relations inform us about inter-object relations in the world? Our spectrum of interest includes: reduction and emergence, mechanistic links between causal theories, belief vs. probability, mind and brain, relations between formal and informal accounts in the special sciences, cognition and the outer world.
The Munich Center for Mathematical Philosophy (MCMP) cordially invites you to “Bridges 2014” in the German House, New York City, on 2 and 3 September, 2014. The 2-day trans-continental meeting in mathematical philosophy will focus on inter-theoretical relations thereby connecting form and content of this philosophical exchange. The workshop will be accompanied by an open-to-public evening event with Stephan Hartmann and Branden Fitelson on 2 September, 2014 (6:30 pm).
The speakers include:
Lucas Champollion (NYU)
David Chalmers (NYU)
Branden Fitelson (Rutgers)
Alvin I. Goldman (Rutgers)
Stephan Hartmann (MCMP/LMU)
Hannes Leitgeb (MCMP/LMU)
Kristina Liefke (MCMP/LMU)
Sebastian Lutz (MCMP/LMU)
Tim Maudlin (NYU)
Thomas Meier (MCMP/LMU)
Roland Poellinger (MCMP/LMU)
Michael Strevens (NYU)
Shamik Dasgupta (Princeton University). Topic: TBA.
Michael Strevens (NYU). Topic:
Title: The Mathematical Route to Causal Understanding
Abstract: Causal explanation is a matter of isolating the elements of the causal web that make a difference to the explanandum event or regularity (so I and others have argued). Causal understanding is a matter of grasping a causal explanation (so says what I have elsewhere called the “simple theory” of understanding). It follows that causal understanding is a matter of grasping the facts about difference-making, and in particular grasping the reasons why some properties of the web are difference-makers and some are not. Mathematical reasoning frequently plays a role in our coming to grasp these reasons, and in some causal explanations, deep mathematical theorems may do almost all the work. In these cases — such as the explanation why a person cannot complete a traverse of the bridges of Königsberg without crossing at least one bridge twice — our understanding seems to hinge more on our appreciation of mathematical than of physical facts. We have the sense that mathematics gives us physical understanding. But this is quite compatible with the explanation in question being causal in exactly the same sense as more unremarkable causal explanations.
Laura Franklin-Hall (NYU). Topic: TBA.
Kathryn Tabb (Columbia University)
Topic: (joint work with Ken Schaffner, Pittsburgh HPS) “Random Walks and Torturous Paths: Moving from the Descriptive to the Etiological in Psychiatry”
Philosophers have employed two different varieties of felt necessity to explain central aspects of agency in addiction and love, respectively. In the case of addiction, the relevant felt need is often described in terms of an appetite, whereas love is characterized by necessities arising from a particular kind of caring. On Dr. Wonderly’s view, the extant literature offers an instructive, but incomplete picture of the roles of felt necessity in addiction and love. Dr. Wonderly argues that a third form of felt necessity – attachment necessity – often better captures central aspects of agency in love and addiction. Recognizing the role of attachment necessity will not only illuminate how felt necessity can impact the value of certain relationships, but it will also allow us to discern important features of addiction and love that remain obscured on extant approaches.
Monique Wonderly is the Harold T. Shapiro Postdoctoral Research Associate in Bioethics. She is primarily interested in puzzles at the intersection of ethics and the nature of emotions. She has published in the areas of applied ethics, philosophy of emotion, and history of philosophy. Her current research focuses on emotional attachment – and in particular, on questions concerning moral agency and ethical treatment that arise when considering certain attachment-related pathologies, including psychopathy and (some forms of) addiction. For more, visit here.
Reception to follow.
The standard way to show the consistency of a theory, or the independence of a given statement from that theory, is to exhibit a model. But there’s more than one thing that’s been called a “model” as this notion has evolved from its original role in 19th century foundations of geometry to its current role as a universallyapplicable tool in logic. This talk investigates some of the changes that bring us to the modern notion, and asks to what extent various kinds of model do, or don’t, successfully demonstrate various kinds of consistency and independence.
When: Friday October 20, 11:00am-1:00pm (with reception to follow)
Where: NYU Philosophy Department, 5 Washington Place, Room 202
Nina Emery (Mount Holyoke), November 3, The Graduate Center, CUNY