Jim Weatherall (University of California, Irvine)
There will be dinner after the talk. If you are interested, please send an email with “Dinner” in the heading to nyphilsci@gmail.com (please note that all are welcome, but only the speaker’s dinner will be covered). If you have any other questions, please email isaac.wilhelm@rutgers.edu.
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Metro Area Philosophy of Science group (MAPS) Presents:
Heather Demarest (University of Colorado, Boulder)
Abstract: I argue that if we take the standard formulation of special relativity seriously, causation is frame-dependent. Thus, many ordinary causal claims require a parameter to specify the relevant frame of reference. This is in contrast to the widely-accepted belief that the causal structure of the world is objectively and absolutely determined by the light cone structure. Any event that can affect another (so the thought goes) must do so via light or matter, and the spacetime structure will tell us which of those came first, absolutely. For instance, according to Carl Hoefer (2009, 694, italics in original), if we assume that all signals travel slower than or equal to the speed of light, “we may take the light-cone structure of Minkowski spacetime as equally representing the causal structure of spacetime.” I argue that causation in relativistic spacetime is not so simple. Events can be extended in space and time, and events can be related to one another by distance and duration. Yet, according to special relativity, extension in space and time (i.e., distances and durations) are not invariant—they depend upon relative motion. Therefore, when ordinary events enter into causal relations, they do so relative to frames of reference, which can yield different causes and different effects. If you want to keep your promises, or bring about one outcome rather than another, you should take note of your reference frame.
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Abstract: Hugh Everett III’s pure wave mechanics, sometimes known as the many-worlds interpretation of quantum mechanics, was proposed as a solution to the quantum measurement problem. Both physicists and philosophers of physics have repeatedly claimed to be able to deduce the standard quantum probabilities from pure wave mechanics alone. We will consider why this is impossible, then consider how Everett himself understood quantum probabilities. This will involve clearly distinguishing between typical and probable quantum worlds.
In my talk, I wish to outline an alternative to a chapter in the history of modern philosophy, and present Kant’s tenets in the Critique of Pure Reason in the spirit of the Vienna Circle, the origin of analytic philosophy.
According to the traditional narrative, Kant overcame the limitations of British empiricism (Hume) and German rationalism (Leibniz) and with his “transcendental philosophy” raised philosophy to a new and superior level. Contemporary Leibnizian critics failed to appreciate the novelty of his approach. Although Kant complimented Salomon Maimon (1753-1800) for having best understood him among his critics, he saw no reason to accept Maimon’s criticism.
From the point of view of the Vienna Circle in the 1920-1930, the traditional narrative should be reversed. In the view of its members, there are no synthetic judgments a priori, and the Kantian project was therefore misconceived in principle. The “Kantian intermezzo”, as Neurath called it, should be skipped and philosophy should rather return to Hume and Leibniz. Exactly this was Maimon’s position. He characterized himself as a “rational dogmatist and empirical skeptic”, referring explicitly to Leibniz and Hume respectively.
I will present Maimon’s criticism of Kant’s synthetic judgments a priori and claim that it is valid. With this, questions concerning the progress of philosophy and its historiography will naturally rise.
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Gideon Freudenthal is professor emeritus at the Cohn Institute for the History and Philosophy of Science and Ideas, Tel-Aviv University.
He is the author (or co-author) of:
Atom and Individual in the Age of Newton (1986)
Exploring the Limits of Preclassical Mechanics (1991)
Classical Marxist Historiography of Science: The Hessen-Grossmann-Thesis (2009)
No Religion without Idolatry. Mendelssohn’s Jewish Enlightenment (2012)
Presented by The New School for Social Research (NSSR) Philosophy Department.
The standard way to show the consistency of a theory, or the independence of a given statement from that theory, is to exhibit a model. But there’s more than one thing that’s been called a “model” as this notion has evolved from its original role in 19th century foundations of geometry to its current role as a universallyapplicable tool in logic. This talk investigates some of the changes that bring us to the modern notion, and asks to what extent various kinds of model do, or don’t, successfully demonstrate various kinds of consistency and independence.
When: Friday October 20, 11:00am-1:00pm (with reception to follow)
Where: NYU Philosophy Department, 5 Washington Place, Room 202
Nina Emery (Mount Holyoke), November 3, The Graduate Center, CUNY
Karen Bennett (Cornell), September 15, The Graduate Center, CUNY
Patricia Blanchette (Notre Dame), October 20, NYU Philosophy Department
Nina Emery (Mount Holyoke), November 3, The Graduate Center, CUNY
The paper draws on the first sentence of Nicomachean Ethics I, but goes beyond interpretation in putting forward a new version of the Guise of the Good (GG). This proposal is Aristotelian in spirit, but defended on philosophical grounds. GG theorists tend to see their views as broadly speaking Aristotelian. And yet they address particular actions in isolation: agents, the thought goes, are motivated to perform a given action by seeing the action or its outcome as good. The paper argues that the GG is most compelling if we distinguish between three levels: the motivation of small-scale actions, the motivation of mid-scale actions or pursuits, and the desire to have one’s life go well. The paper analyzes the relation between small-, mid-, and large-scale motivation in terms of Guidance, Substance, and Motivational Dependence. In its Aristotelian version, the argument continues, the GG belongs to the theory of the human good.
Katja Maria Vogt, Professor of Philosophy at Columbia University. She specializes in ancient philosophy, ethics, and normative epistemology. In her books and papers, she focuses on questions that figure both in ancient and in contemporary discussions: What are values? What kind of values are knowledge and truth? What does it mean to want one’s life to go well?
Presented by The New School for Social Research (NSSR) Philosophy Department.
CUNY-Milan Annual Interdisciplinary Workshop in Philosophy, a joint initiative of both institutions’ philosophy departments, is aimed at promoting advanced studies in core analytic topics. This year’s workshop, first in a series of annual events, will focus on belief. Albeit this workshop’s main objective is to advance research in Philosophy of Mind and Logic, the organizers are committed to maintain the interdisciplinary character of the workshop.
This year’s inaugural conference will focus on belief. It is the aim of the organizers to provide an interdisciplinary perspective on the topic of belief. Some of the topics to be discussed include:
Mental states/attitudes and beliefs; the connection between imagination and belief; group beliefs; logic of belief; belief and logical omniscience; beliefs about blame and forgiveness; the difference between conscious and unconscious beliefs; confabulations of belief; the experience of belief; what it is like to believe; norms of beliefs; knowledge and belief; metaphysics of belief; religious beliefs; political beliefs; manipulation of belief; content of belief; belief and bias; belief and language; belief as constituting sexual, racial and gender based identity; delusional beliefs; continental perspectives on belief; historical perspectives on belief.
Keynote speakers:
Organisers:
SWIP-Analytic Fall 2018 Events
Thursday, September 20, 4:00pm-6:00pm
CUNY Graduate Center, Room 9205
Meghan Sullivan (Notre Dame), “Temporal Discounting in Psychology and Philosophy: Four Proposals for Mutual Research Aid”
Thursday, October 18, 4:00pm-6:00pm
Location TBA
Amie Thomasson (Dartmouth), Title TBA
Thursday, November 8, 4:00pm-6:00pm
Location TBA
Jessica Wilson (Toronto), Title TBA
More details will be added as they become available. Click here to download the flyer as a PDF.
SWIP-Analytic Fall 2018 Events
Thursday, September 20, 4:00pm-6:00pm
CUNY Graduate Center, Room 9205
Meghan Sullivan (Notre Dame), “Temporal Discounting in Psychology and Philosophy: Four Proposals for Mutual Research Aid”
Thursday, October 18, 4:00pm-6:00pm
Location TBA
Amie Thomasson (Dartmouth), Title TBA
Thursday, November 8, 4:00pm-6:00pm
Location TBA
Jessica Wilson (Toronto), Title TBA
More details will be added as they become available. Click here to download the flyer as a PDF.
On the face of it, we live in a world rife with materially composed objects. But what is it exactly for some (smaller, spatiotemporally located) objects to materially compose, or ‘make up’, another? Intuitively, this has something to do with causal interactions among the parts, but causal accounts of composition have been surprisingly rare, due to their seeming to face pressing difficulties associated with extensional inadequacy, vague existence, and causal overdetermination. Here I motivate, present, and defend a causal account of composition, highlighting along the way its advantages over accounts based in classical mereology.
SWIP-Analytic Fall 2018 Events
Thursday, September 20, 4:00pm-6:00pm
CUNY Graduate Center, Room 9205
Meghan Sullivan (Notre Dame), “Temporal Discounting in Psychology and Philosophy: Four Proposals for Mutual Research Aid”
Thursday, October 18, 4:00pm-6:00pm
Location TBA
Amie Thomasson (Dartmouth), Title TBA
Thursday, November 8, 4:00pm-6:00pm
Location TBA
Jessica Wilson (Toronto), Title TBA
More details will be added as they become available. Click here to download the flyer as a PDF.
There is a broad consensus that Aristotle introduced the concept of matter in order to develop a consistent account of substantial change. However, it is disputed which role matter fulfills in substantial change. According to the traditional interpretation, matter persists while taking on or losing a substantial form. According to a rival interpretation, matter does not persist in substantial change; instead, it is an entity from which a new substance can emerge and which ceases to exist in this process. In my view, both interpretations are problematic in the light of Aristotle’s broader ontological project and are at odds with the way Aristotle describes the substantial generation of living beings. On the basis of Aristotle’s biological theory, I will suggest that Aristotelian matter is a continuant in substantial generation, but does not satisfy the common criteria for persistence that apply to individual substances.
Anna Schriefl
Anna Schriefl is Wissenschaftliche Mitarbeiterin (assistant professor) at the University of Bonn, and currently a visiting scholar at the New School. She has published a book about Plato’s criticism of money and wealth, and most recently an introduction into Stoicism (both in German).