The New York University Center for Bioethics is pleased to invite submissions of abstracts for the 4th Annual Philosophical Bioethics Workshop, to be held at NYU on Friday and Saturday, May 3-4, 2024.
We are seeking to showcase new work in philosophical bioethics, broadly understood. This includes (but is not limited to) neuroethics, environmental ethics, animal ethics, reproductive ethics, research ethics, ethics of AI, data ethics, public health ethics, gender and race in bioethics, and clinical ethics.
Our keynote speaker will be Professor Shelly Kagan, Yale University. There will be five additional slots for papers chosen from among the submitted abstracts, including one slot set aside for a graduate student speaker. The most promising graduate student submission will be awarded a Graduate Prize, which includes an award of $500, and may include coverage of travel expenses, depending upon university policies at the time of the award. Please indicate in your submission email whether you would like to be considered for the Graduate Prize.
Please submit extended abstracts of between 750 and 1,000 words to philosophicalbioethics@gmail.com by 11:59 pm Eastern Time on Wednesday, January 31, 2024. Abstracts should be formatted for blind review, and papers should be suitable for presentation in 30-35 minutes. Email notifications of acceptance will be sent out by Friday, February 16, 2024.
When submitting your abstract, please also indicate whether you would be interested in serving as a commentator-chair in the event that your abstract is not selected for presentation. We will be inviting five additional participants to serve as commentator-chairs.
This year’s Philosophical Bioethics Workshop is organized by S. Matthew Liao, Daniel Fogal, Claudia Passos-Ferreira, Dan Khokar, and Jonathan Knutzen of the NYU Center for Bioethics.
The Saul Kripke Center is pleased to announce that James Walsh (Assistant Professor, Philosophy, NYU) will deliver a talk on Friday, May 10th, 2024, from 4:15 to 6:15 pm at the CUNY Graduate Center (Room 9207). The talk is free and open to all.
Title: Modal definability and Kripke’s theory of truth
Abstract: In Outline of a Theory of Truth, Kripke introduces some of the central concepts of the logical study of truth and paradox. He informally defines some of these–such as groundedness and paradoxicality–using modal locutions. We introduce a modal language for regimenting Kripke’s informal definitions and characterize the modally definable sets. Though groundedness and paradoxicality are expressible in the modal language, we prove that intrinsicality–which Kripke emphasizes but does not define modally–is not.