Calendar

Does art have anything interesting to do with pleasure? The aesthetic hedonist answers positively, claiming that the value of artworks qua artworks lie in their power to please those who are properly engaged with them. Recent critics of hedonism answer the question in the negative, arguing that the power to please cannot properly explain the value of artworks. In this paper, I point to a blind spot in the dialectic between the hedonic orthodoxy and its recent critics: though the hedonist is wrong to claim that artworks are valuable because they are endowed with the power to please, the contemporary critic of hedonism mistakenly disconnects art from pleasure. The bulk of the paper consists in a challenge to the two assumptions that underlie this dialectic: (1) the assumption that pleasure is merely subjective and so incapable of disclosing the value of its object, and (2) the assumption that pleasure can be connected to art only hedonically, as the answer to the question “what makes artworks valuable?” By undermining these assumptions, I carve out space for a neglected alternative between aesthetic hedonism and its non-affective denial: this is the view that, though pleasure does not constitute the value of artworks, it does constitute proper aesthetic evaluation. On this neglected alternative, pleasure is connected to artworks insofar as it is the proper response merited by their value, value that the pleasure discloses. It is the value of artworks that gives us reasons to feel pleasure rather than the feeling of pleasure that gives us reasons to attribute value to them.

Reception to follow in 6th floor lounge.

Alfred Hitchcock’s Vertigo is a brilliant, suspenseful mystery exploring the often dangerous intimacy between love, compulsion, and death.  It is also a profound meditation on the power of art.  While it invites us to go on seeing art as a mimesis – a “representation,” or “imitation” of life – it also cryptically asks whether art objects might do more than merely represent life, even whether they might exercise power over death. James Stewart’s Scotty has been compared to Orpheus in quest of Eurydice; I suggest that he’s worth comparing to Admetus, who wished he could be Orpheus, and who imagines clinging to a statue to recapture his lost wife. The spell cast by Hitchcock in Vertigo shows us just how bewitching art can be when it has us under its sway.

Monday, March 19, 2018 at 6pm. This event is part of the Philosophy Series at The Cornelia Street Café, located at 29 Cornelia Street, New York, NY 10014 (near Sixth Avenue and West 4th St.). Admission is $10, which includes the price of one drink. Reservations are recommended (212. 989.9319)

Nickolas Pappas is Professor of Philosophy at City College and the Graduate Center, CUNY, where he has taught since 1993. He is the author of several books and around 40 articles, mostly on topics in ancient philosophy. His books include the Routledge Philosophical Guidebook to Plato’s Republic, now in its third edition; and most recently The Philosopher’s New Clothes (Routledge, 2016).

Two CUNY Philosophy professors (Noël Carroll and Jesse Prinz) will present research alongside PhD student Zoe Cunliffe and alumna Laura Di Summa-Knoop in the upcoming Workshop on “Naturalized Aesthetics of Film”, taking place March 27th from 2-6pm in GC Room 5307. Additional presenters include Joerg Fingerhut (postdoc, Berlin School of Mind and Brain) and Murray Smith (University of Kent). The workshop celebrates Smith’s new monograph Film, Art, and the Third Culture, which defends an interdisciplinary approach to film studies.

See the poster below for additional details (including the workshop schedule).
Click here to download it as a PDF.

The circa 9th century CE poet-saint Saraha enjoys a close association with spontaneity in both his reported actions and recorded works. This association leads him to be popularly read and remembered as a freewheeling antinomian sacred figure opposed to institutions, rituals, and even social norms. His appears to be a call to joyful chaos. But many of his verses invite readers towards a different kind of chaos, towards mental/perceptual chaos as the path towards correct conventional perception.

What does it mean to correctly perceive an object? Many Buddhist sources describe how perception functions, and theorize the differences between correct and incorrect perception. A related important distinction is made between conventional and ultimate truth in the discussion of the reality of phenomena even when correctly perceived. But this arguably epistemic distinction may also be understood as the difference between an ordinary person’s correct perception and a Buddha’s perception. I am not here exploring ultimate truth. I am interested in conventional truth, in what makes it true. Broadly, correct conventional perception is associated with the product of a rational mind processing sense perceptions fed to it by functioning sense organs, and conventional truth then is the experience of that reality. Correct conventional perception can be contrasted with incorrect conventional perception, which would be perception based on an irrational or deluded mind, or an experience based on damaged or non-functioning sense organs.

Saraha, however, sings a different tune. His work tells us that the very process of identifying and recognizing objects – what most of us would associate with the basic skills necessary to get around in the world – is itself deluded, its objects adventitious. He calls this kind of perception drenpa (dran pa; usually translated as mindfulness, memory, or recollection). In other words, he claims that our very perception of objects – no matter how carefully or clearly experienced – is evidence of our being deluded. In contrast, correct conventional perception is the undoing of that object-making, what he refers to as drenmé (dran med). Drenmé is an uncommon term the contexts of the two truths and meditation. Usually denoting a swoon or a coma, here it refers to a reversal or undoing of drenpa. What does it mean – if it means anything – to describe our perception of objects itself as evidence of our delusion? Can perception as object-making ever produce truth?

The Columbia Society for Comparative Philosophy (CSCP) is a University Seminar dedicated to the advancement of projects that draw on both western and non-western philosophy. The CSCP meets monthly on the campus of Columbia University and occasionally hosts conferences.

Please save the following dates for our upcoming talks:

March 30: Kin Cheung (Moravian College)

April 13: Lara Braitstein (McGill University)

May 11: David Cummiskey (Bates College)

Elliot Paul, assistant professor of philosophy, and Joan Snitzer, cochair and director of visual arts in the Department of Art History, come together to discuss the relationship between creative expression and appreciation in this installment of From the Faculty Lounge. Paul and Snitzer will explore creativity’s role in our happiness and moral choices, and how an artist’s ownership of their creativity compares to an audience’s influence.

Moderated by Provost Linda Bell

Space is limited and available on a first-come, first-served basis. Please arrive early as this event will be filmed and doors will close promptly at 6:30 PM.

From the Faculty Lounge
What is Creativity?
Thursday, May 3, 2018
6:30 PM
Sulzberger Parlor, 3rd Floor Barnard Hall

For more information, visit barnard.edu/events. View previously recorded conversations here.

At the core of Kantian liberalism is a conception of the independent autonomous subject. On the other hand, the most central and distinguishing feature of Buddhist philosophy is the doctrine of no-self. It thus seems that Buddhists should reject Kantian liberalism. My larger project develops the connections between Buddhist perfectionism, liberalism, and principles of justice. In this paper, I focus on Buddhist and Kantian conceptions of self-constitution, but my ultimate concern is the significance of the doctrine of no-self to theories of justice.

Buddhists need some conception of a minimal self to account for the karmic-continuity of persons and also to provide an adequate account of the subjectivity of experience. I argue that we should reject the (Abhidharma) reductionist view of the self as a mere fiction that is reducible to its simpler and more basic parts. As is often noted, the Buddhist reductionist approach is similar to Derek Parfit’s view. Parfit also argues that there is no deep metaphysical self and that relations of personal identity are reducible to relations of psychological connectedness and causal continuity in a series of experiences. Christine Korsgaard has responded to Parfit’s reductionist view by developing a non-metaphysical account of Kantian agency and self-constitution. I argue that the Buddhist doctrine of no-self is consistent with a more minimal, non-substantial, emergent, view of the self. This approach, which is more fully developed by Evan Thomson, Matthew MacKenzie, Georges Dreyfus, and others, is surprisingly similar to Korsgaard’s practical conception of the self. As a result, the non-reductionist Buddhist approach is also not vulnerable to Korsgaard’s objection to reductionist views. In addition, I argue that the process of self-constitution is embedded in a recursive nexus of dependent origination, and reject Korsgaard’s conception of the independent autonomous subject, which she refers to as “over and above” its ends. In short, a Buddhist can accept Korsgaard’s basic account of self-constitution but nonetheless reject the Kantian idea of the independent autonomous subject. For Buddhists, the Kantian autonomous subject is instead part of the “primal confusion” that projects a reified subject-other division on experience. This confusion is the source of existential suffering, anxiety and stress, which characterizes too much of the human condition. The goal is to transcend the Kantian subject and internalize the pervasive interdependence of persons. Instead of the autonomous self, Buddhism embraces a perfectionist ideal, of a non-egocentric reorientation and re-constitution of the self.

Buddhists thus have reason to reject Kantian liberalism, if it is based on the autonomy and independence of persons. In his shift to Political Liberalism, John Rawls recasts the conception of the person, as “a self-originating source of valid claims,” and emphasizes that this conception is restricted to the political domain. It is part of a narrow conception of the “moral powers” of a free and equal citizen; it is not a metaphysical conception or comprehensive ideal. I conclude by exploring the contrast between Buddhist Perfectionism and Political Liberalism.

With a Response From:

Carol Rovane (Columbia University)

——————

Also, please visit our website:

http://www.cbs.columbia.edu/cscp/

Co-Chairs

Professor Jonathan Gold

Associate Professor, Princeton University, Department of Religion

jcgold@princeton.edu

Professor Hagop Sarkissian

Associate Professor, The City University of New York, Baruch College | Graduate Center, Department of Philosophy

hagop.sarkissian@baruch.cuny.edu

Rapporteur

Jay Ramesh

jr3203@columbia.edu

The Feminist Epistemology and Philosophy of Race Reading Group‘s first Fall semester meeting will be:

Tuesday September 4th from 11:15 am to 12:45pm in room 5489 at The Graduate Center, CUNY.

The Graduate Center is located at 365 Fifth Ave, New York, NY 10016.

We will read:

Emmalon Davis’ “On Epistemic Appropriation.”

The CUNY Graduate Center Advanced Research Collaborative (ARC) and the Philosophy Program present a talk and book panel on:
RACIAL JUSTICE
WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 3 (Rooms 9204-5)

4:15-5:00 PHILOSOPHY COLLOQUIUM LECTURE:
“Racial Justice”: Charles W. Mills, Philosophy, CUNY Graduate Center

5:00-5:05 Break

5:05-5:45 BOOK PANEL on Charles W. Mills’s 2017 book, Black Rights/White Wrongs: The Critique of Racial Liberalism

Frank M. Kirkland (CUNY Hunter College & the Grad Center)

John Pittman (CUNY John Jay College)

5:45-6:30 Q & A

6:30-7:30 BOOK PARTY—Philosophy common room, 7113 (food and drink)

You probably know the Lucas Brothers from their Netflix comedy special On Drugs or their appearances in TV shows and movies like Lady Dynamite and 22 Jump Street. You might not know that they are serious students of philosophy. Join us on Wednesday, November 28th at 7:30 PM in the Strand Bookstore’s 2nd Floor Art Department as Kenny and Keith Lucas join Michael Brownstein (Associate Professor of Philosophy at John Jay College and author of The Implicit Mind) to discuss how philosophy shapes their comedy, how comedy works, the weirdly popular idea that comedians are today’s philosophers, and more.

The price of admission is a $5 gift certificate to the Strand. (You were probably going to spend $5 at the Strand some time soon, anyway.) Please purchase tickets here and share the Facebook event. I will take all the help I can get in spreading the word.

Stay tuned for more info about Kwame Anthony Appiah’s December 4th talk about identity at Philosophy in the Library!