Calendar

There is a broad consensus that Aristotle introduced the concept of matter in order to develop a consistent account of substantial change. However, it is disputed which role matter fulfills in substantial change. According to the traditional interpretation, matter persists while taking on or losing a substantial form. According to a rival interpretation, matter does not persist in substantial change; instead, it is an entity from which a new substance can emerge and which ceases to exist in this process. In my view, both interpretations are problematic in the light of Aristotle’s broader ontological project and are at odds with the way Aristotle describes the substantial generation of living beings. On the basis of Aristotle’s biological theory, I will suggest that Aristotelian matter is a continuant in substantial generation, but does not satisfy the common criteria for persistence that apply to individual substances.

Anna Schriefl
Anna Schriefl is Wissenschaftliche Mitarbeiterin (assistant professor) at the University of Bonn, and currently a visiting scholar at the New School. She has published a book about Plato’s criticism of money and wealth, and most recently an introduction into Stoicism (both in German).

Presented by Metro Area Philosophers of Science

Seen from a distance, competing views of laws of nature attend to different aspects of their target concept. The Best System Analysis (‘BSA’) focuses on the role of laws in systematizing our thoughts about particular facts, while non-Humean (‘realist’) views focus on whatever it is – N-relations among universals, powers – that pushes the universe from one state to another. Nothing stops us from combining these views: with the BSA, we can restrict the laws of science to summarizing particulars, while at the same time, with our preferred realism, positing a ‘driver’ that makes those particulars as they are.
So far, there have been only a few attempts to hybridize the BSA with some form of realism, and then only with the powers view. I argue that there is a deep assumption woven into the fabric of realism from Descartes’s time on: that the laws of a science report on facts, which in turn either are or involve the realist’s chosen driver. I argue that the best-known attempt to hybridize the BSA with a power’s view – Heather Demarest’s potency-BSA – still makes this Cartesian assumption, and faces significant objections as a result. The lesson is that anyone attempting to create hybrids should abandon that assumption entirely. After formulating what I take to be a more defensible powers-BSA hybrid, I go on to show how one might cross-breed the BSA with primitivism and with the universals view. By abandoning the Cartesian assumption, we can create hybrids that are considerably more defensible than their realist parents.

Location: Plaza View Room, 12th Floor, Lowenstein Building of Fordham Lincoln Center (113 W 60th St).

Directions: Enter at the corner of 60th and Columbus, and have a university ID ready. Please tell the security that you are attending an event hosted by the philosophy department. To get the Plaza View Room, take the escalators one floor up to find the elevators. Only some elevators go up to the 12th floor; for those that only go to the 11th floor, go to 11 and turn to the center of the main hallway to see a stairway to 12. Upon arriving at the 12th floor, take a right and walk all the way to the end through the doors. Please email Peter Tan (ptan8@fordham.edu) for any issues.

Due to technical limitations, the talk will be in-person only.

Western metaphysics is based on the opposition between reality and appearance. This construction essentially rests on a visual model, or more exactly on some staging of what visual experience is.
I am going to question the basis of this metaphysics, by taking into account the reality of appearances and reflecting on their various uses, in particular artistic ones. This path will be taken in the first place by shifting the focus of philosophical analysis from visual to acoustic models. Thus, I will envisage a realism of echoes, as opposed to the metaphysics of shadows.

Biography:

Jocelyn Benoist, born in 1968, is Professor at the university Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne, where he teaches Contemporary Philosophy, and currently a member of the ‘Institut Universitaire de France’. He has dedicated his early work to phenomenology and the bridges between phenomenology and early Analytic philosophy. For some time he was the Director of the Husserl Archive of Paris at the Ecole Normale Supérieure. Then, he developed a personal investigation into the meaning of realism in philosophy. He has published many books, including recently: Toward a Contextual Realism, H.U.P., 2021, and Von der Phänomenologie zum Realismus, Mohr Siebeck, 2022.

In this paper, I explore the role that metaphor plays in the development of new scientific models. My goal is to illustrate metaphor’s fecundity in this regard, the way in which it extends our understanding in surprisingly diverse ways. As Mary Hesse put this point, “it is precisely in its extension that the fruitfulness of the model may lie” (1980, 114).

The particular focus of my paper is on the history of what John Haugeland called mind design: the use of mechanical models to reverse-engineer how minds work (1997, 1). My history focuses on two such models: the clockwork model and the computer model. In each case, I show how a metaphorical understanding of the model led to conceptual innovation in two distinct ways. First, it provided an interpretive frame that guided new research by offering an abstract, hypothesized structure to be later filled in by empirical research (Camp 2020). Second, it provided a concrete exemplar to contrast with human minds (Daston 1994). For instance, while on the one hand Descartes invoked the clockwork model to explain how color vision works (Adams 2015), he also invoked it as a vivid illustration of how human reasoning does not work (Riskin 2016).

It is this second source of conceptual innovation that is the real core of the paper; it reveals what I call the dialectic of mind design. This dialectic is especially evident in our tendency to redefine what it is to be human in response to new technological developments. For instance, it is evident when we take something that was previously assumed to be paradigmatic of mental acuity, such as the ability to play chess, and redefine it as something merely mechanical (Ensmenger 2012). But it is equally well evident when we take something that was previously taken to be mechanical—such as color vision—and redefine it as paradigmatically mental (Chalmers 1997; cf. Adams and Browning 2020). The concept of mindedness is, in this sense, a constantly moving goalpost that is perennially being redefined in response to new technological developments.