Mar
29
Fri
Thinking and Living the Good Life @ Philosophy Department, Fordham U
Mar 29 – Mar 31 all-day

The theme of our conference, “Thinking and Living the Good Life,” asks participants to think upon what it means to live well in contemporary society, how we can know the right or best way to live, and the role of thought in the enterprise of human life. Evocative of ancient theories of virtue, the theme of the good life also bears on prominent areas of discussion in contemporary political philosophy, epistemology, and metaphysics. Papers topics may include, but are not limited to: the relationship between political structures and the shared goal of realizing a common good; the complexities that arise in trying to achieve knowledge of the good; and the nature of the good in and of itself. Our conference aims to bring together graduate students that work in different areas in order to think through this singular theme of the good life and to search for commonalities and intersections amongst a broad array of approaches.

Abstracts of no more than 300 words should be submitted to fordhamredstarline@gmail.com by December 20, 2018. Authors of selected papers will be notified by January 10, 2019.

Keynote speakers:

Fordham University

Organisers:

Fordham University
Fordham University
Fordham University
Fordham University
Fordham University
May
2
Thu
On Being Abstract – Pete Mandik (William Patterson) @ Philosophy Dept. Schmitt 104
May 2 @ 5:30 pm

In this session, Mandik will expand on his idea that persons are abstract things. To do this, he will discuss recent philosophical issues about personal identity, mind-uploading, and whether you could upload your mind to a piece of technology and survive.

 

https://philevents.org/event/show/72442

May
6
Mon
“Ultimate Meaning: We Don’t Have it, We Can’t Get it, and We Should be Very, Very Sad” @ Dweck Center, Brooklyn Public Library
May 6 @ 7:30 pm – 9:00 pm

5/6 – Philosophy in the Library: Rivka Weinberg, “Ultimate Meaning: We Don’t Have it, We Can’t Get it, and We Should be Very, Very Sad” @ the Dweck Center // 7:30 P.M.-9:00 P.M.

Apr
18
Sat
Mind, Body, Passion. NYC Workshop in Early Modern Philosophy @ Fordham U. Philosophy Dept.
Apr 18 – Apr 19 all-day

The workshop, which is now in its 10th year, aims to foster exchange and collaboration among scholars, students, and anyone with an interest in Early Modern Philosophy. This year’s workshop will focus on the topic of “Mind, Body, Passion” in Early Modern Philosophy (roughly the period from 1600-1800).

We welcome submissions on the conference topic, which may be broadly construed to include mind-body identity, mind-body interaction, embodiment, philosophy of emotion, aesthetics, etc. For consideration, please submit abstracts of 250-300 words to newyorkcityearlymodern@gmail.com no later than December 31, 2019.

Keynote speakers:

New York University
University of Toronto at Mississauga

Organisers:

Fordham University
Bar-Ilan University, Ramat Gan
Fordham University
May
29
Sun
The Case against Death: Ingemar Patrick Linden @ Unameable Books
May 29 @ 7:00 pm – 8:00 pm

A philosopher refutes our culturally embedded acceptance of death, arguing instead for the desirability of anti-aging science and radical life extension.

Author Ingemar Patrick Linden will talk with film director Miguel Drake McLaughlin about his new book.

Ingemar Patrick Linden’s central claim is that death is evil. In this first comprehensive refutation of the most common arguments in favor of human mortality, he writes passionately in favor of antiaging science and radical life extension. We may be on the cusp of a new human condition where scientists seek to break through the arbitrarily set age limit of human existence to address aging as an illness that can be cured. The book, however, is not about the science and technology of life extension but whether we should want more life. For Linden, the answer is a loud and clear “yes.”

The acceptance of death is deeply embedded in our culture. Linden examines the views of major philosophical voices of the past, whom he calls “death’s ardent advocates.” These include the Buddha, Socrates, Plato, Lucretius, and Montaigne. All have taught what he calls “the Wise View,” namely, that we should not fear death. After setting out his case against death, Linden systematically examines each of the accepted arguments for death—that aging and death are natural, that death is harmless, that life is overrated, that living longer would be boring, and that death saves us from overpopulation. He concludes with a “dialogue concerning the badness of human mortality.” Though Linden acknowledges that The Case Against Death is a negative polemic, he also defends it as optimistic, in that the badness of death is a function of the goodness of life.

Mar
7
Thu
Metaphysical Society of America Conference: Identity, Difference, and the Difference that Metaphysics Makes @ Lowenstein Building, Fordham University, Lincoln Center
Mar 7 – Mar 10 all-day

Ideas about “identity” and “difference” proliferate in the news media, in higher education, in political disputations, and in critical theories of society.  Claims about “identity” and “difference” can readily be found at work in a wide variety of typologies, including those of race, class, ethnicity, gender, sexuality, religion, nationality, political affiliation, ability and disability, animality and humanity, etc.  But what exactly do we mean when we speak of “identity” or “difference”?  And if we achieve greater clarity about the metaphysical presuppositions and implications of “identity” and “difference,” what difference would that make?

A serious metaphysical examination of “identity” and “difference” will expectedly generate a wide variety of questions.  Is discourse about what is “identical” reducible to discourse about what is “the same”?  Is discourse about what is “different” reducible to discourse about what is “other”?  Can something be “the same” without being “identical,” and can something be “other” without being “different”?  When we speak about “being,” does our speaking about it have many different senses (is it spoken of analogically), or instead does our speaking about being always have the same sense (is it spoken of univocally)?  Does the “identity” of a thing depend mainly on the thing’s status as an individual, or does it depend instead on the thing’s membership in a general kind?  Does an understanding of identity depend on some reference to what is different?  Or does an understanding of difference depend on some reference to identity?  What is the relation of knowing to being: is it one of identity, or difference, or some combination of both?  Is it possible for a knower to discern real differences between things without discerning intelligible differences, or does the indiscernibility of intelligible differences imply that there are no real differences at all but rather an identity?  Does difference depend on negation, or can one assert that there is difference without having to assert that something is “not”?  Does it make sense to speak of an ontological difference, i.e., a difference between Being and beings, or is it senseless  – maybe even useless – to speak of a difference between Being and beings?  Is “being” different from “nothing,” or is it possible for differences to exist only among beings (in which case there apparently cannot be a difference between “being” and “nothing”)?

In spite of the virtual ubiquity of discourses about identity and difference, there is a dearth of discourse about the metaphysical presuppositions and implications of “identity and difference.”  With its choice of conference theme for 2024 (“Identity, Difference, and the Difference that Metaphysics Makes”), the Metaphysical Society of America wishes to provoke deeper thinking about the metaphysics of identity and difference, with the hope that such deeper thinking will make a meaningful difference in both theory and practice.

Proposals for papers on the conference theme are especially encouraged, but papers on other metaphysical topics are also welcome.  Please note: when selecting which submissions to accept for this conference, the Program Committee will regard “relevance to theme” as one important criterion among others.

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Guidelines for the Submission of Abstracts, and for Aristotle and Plato Prize Candidates

Abstracts of approximately 500 words should be submitted electronically by September 30, 2023, to: secretary@metaphysicalsociety.org.

Aristotle Prize: Those wishing to be considered for the Aristotle Prize of the Metaphysical Society should submit full papers along with their abstracts.  Eligibility for the Aristotle Prize extends only to persons who have not yet earned a Ph.D..  Those wishing to be considered for the Aristotle Prize should express this wish clearly in the email note that accompanies their submission.  Papers submitted for the Aristotle Prize are subject to a 3,750 word limit; this word limit applies to the body of the text to be read at the meeting, and not to footnotes or other supporting material.  The Aristotle Prize carries a cash award of $500, inclusion in the program, and assistance with the costs associated with attending the meeting.  To be considered for the Aristotle Prize, full papers and abstracts must be submitted by September 30, 2023 to:secretary@metaphysicalsociety.org.

Plato Prize: Those wishing to be considered for the Plato Prize of the Metaphysical Society should submit full papers along with their abstracts.  Eligibility for the Plato Prize extends only to persons who received a Ph.D. degree within six years of the conference submission date (i.e., persons who hold a Ph.D. degree which was conferred after September 30, 2017).  Those wishing to be considered for the Plato Prize should express this wish clearly in the email note that accompanies their submission.  Papers submitted for the Plato Prize are subject to a 3,750 word limit; this word limit applies to the body of the text to be read at the meeting, and not to footnotes or other supporting material.  The Plato Prize carries a cash award of $500, inclusion in the program, and assistance with the costs associated with attending the meeting.  To be considered for the Plato Prize, full papers and abstracts must be submitted by September 30, 2023 to:secretary@metaphysicalsociety.org.

Travel Grants: Thanks to the generous support of past presidents of the MSA and a grant from the Hocking-Cabot Fund for Systematic Philosophy, the Metaphysical Society is pleased to be able to offer reimbursements for travel expenses up to $350 to graduate students whose papers are selected for the conference program (those wishing to receive such reimbursements must provide the Metaphysical Society with all relevant expense-receipts).

Those who submit abstracts, and those who submit full papers plus abstracts for the Aristotle Prize or Plato Prize, will receive notice of the Program Committee’s decision on their submission no later than December 1, 2023.