The universe plausibly has an infinite future and an infinite past. Given unlimited time, every qualitative state that has ever occurred will occur again, infinitely many times. There will thus exist in the future persons arbitrarily similar to you, in any desired respects. A person sufficiently similar to you in the right respects will qualify as literally another incarnation of you. Some theories about the nature of persons rule this out; however, these theories also imply, given an infinite past, that your present existence is a probability-zero event. Hence, your present existence is evidence against such theories of persons.
Vegan reception to follow.
Here is the tentative schedule for PoPRocks sessions this semester. We will be meeting, usually, on Thursday or Friday evenings from 7:00 pm to 9:00 pm in the 2nd floor seminar room at the NYU philosophy department.
Th. 10/03 Luke Roelofs
Fr. 10/18 Josh Myers
CANCELLED Fr. 10/25 Sam Clarke
Th. 10/31 Simon Brown
Th. 11/14 Noga Gratvol
Fr. 11/22 Cristina Ballarini
Th. 12/12 Rodrigo Diaz
You can still sign up to present! Of course, the earlier you request, the easier it is to schedule a session.
Theoretical reasoning is a process by which we form doxastic states on the basis of our previously-held attitudes. One of the foundational questions about the nature of reasoning is with which mental states we can reason. Many discussions of reasoning assume that we can only reason with doxastic states such as beliefs. In this paper, I argue that we can also reason with imaginings. The argument has two parts. First, I argue that epistemic uses of the imagination instantiate a number of markers which, taken together, are very good evidence for a process counting as reasoning. These include (rule-based) operation on contents, the transmission of justification, transitions between mental states that we can be held epistemically responsible for, and the ability of imaginings to enter into explicit conscious deliberation. Second, I argue that reasoning with imagination is not reducible to reasoning with beliefs. Imaginings and beliefs make different kinds of epistemically appropriate transitions available. This is, in part, due to the distinctive way that imaginative episodes develop their content over time. Thus, the markers of reasoning that epistemic uses of the imagination instantiate cannot be explained away. One interesting upshot is that, although reasoning with imagination and reasoning with beliefs are quite psychologically different in certain important respects, they share an underlying epistemic structure.
Here is the tentative schedule for PoPRocks sessions this semester. We will be meeting, usually, on Thursday or Friday evenings from 7:00 pm to 9:00 pm in the 2nd floor seminar room at the NYU philosophy department.
Th. 10/03 Luke Roelofs
Fr. 10/18 Josh Myers
Fr. 10/25 Sam Clarke
Th. 10/31 Simon Brown
Th. 11/14 Noga Gratvol
Fr. 11/22 Cristina Ballarini
Th. 12/12 Rodrigo Diaz
You can still sign up to present! Of course, the earlier you request, the easier it is to schedule a session.
Here is the tentative schedule for PoPRocks sessions this semester. We will be meeting, usually, on Thursday or Friday evenings from 7:00 pm to 9:00 pm in the 2nd floor seminar room at the NYU philosophy department.
Th. 10/03 Luke Roelofs
Fr. 10/18 Josh Myers
CANCELLED Fr. 10/25 Sam Clarke
CANCELLED Th. 10/31 Simon Brown
Th. 11/14 Noga Gratvol
Fr. 11/22 Cristina Ballarini
Th. 12/12 Rodrigo Diaz
You can still sign up to present! Of course, the earlier you request, the easier it is to schedule a session.
Here is the tentative schedule for PoPRocks sessions this semester. We will be meeting, usually, on Thursday or Friday evenings from 7:00 pm to 9:00 pm in the 2nd floor seminar room at the NYU philosophy department.
Th. 10/03 Luke Roelofs
Fr. 10/18 Josh Myers
CANCELLED Fr. 10/25 Sam Clarke
Th. 10/31 Simon Brown
Th. 11/14 Noga Gratvol
Fr. 11/22 Cristina Ballarini
Th. 12/12 Rodrigo Diaz
You can still sign up to present! Of course, the earlier you request, the easier it is to schedule a session.
Here is the tentative schedule for PoPRocks sessions this semester. We will be meeting, usually, on Thursday or Friday evenings from 7:00 pm to 9:00 pm in the 2nd floor seminar room at the NYU philosophy department.
Th. 10/03 Luke Roelofs
Fr. 10/18 Josh Myers
CANCELLED Fr. 10/25 Sam Clarke
Th. 10/31 Simon Brown
Th. 11/14 Noga Gratvol
Fr. 11/22 Cristina Ballarini
Th. 12/12 Rodrigo Diaz
You can still sign up to present! Of course, the earlier you request, the easier it is to schedule a session.
Here is the tentative schedule for PoPRocks sessions this semester. We will be meeting, usually, on Thursday or Friday evenings from 7:00 pm to 9:00 pm in the 2nd floor seminar room at the NYU philosophy department.
Th. 10/03 Luke Roelofs
Fr. 10/18 Josh Myers
CANCELLED Fr. 10/25 Sam Clarke
Th. 10/31 Simon Brown
Th. 11/14 Noga Gratvol
Fr. 11/22 Cristina Ballarini
Th. 12/12 Rodrigo Diaz
You can still sign up to present! Of course, the earlier you request, the easier it is to schedule a session.
PopRocks is a read-ahead, works-in-progress workshop for graduate students and postdocs in the philosophy of cognitive science and mind. We meet on Fridays to hear and discuss a paper, and try to keep a low-pressure, constructive environment. If that sounds useful to you please get in touch and sign up to present!
Feb 21 – Juliette Vazard
Mar 6 – Stephan Pohl
Mar 27 – David Udell
Apr 3 – Simon Brown
Apr 10 – David Barack
Apr 17 – Kathryn Pendoley
PopRocks is a read-ahead, works-in-progress workshop for graduate students and postdocs in the philosophy of cognitive science and mind. We meet on Fridays to hear and discuss a paper, and try to keep a low-pressure, constructive environment. If that sounds useful to you please get in touch and sign up to present!
Feb 21 – Juliette Vazard
Mar 6 – Stephan Pohl
Mar 27 – David Udell
Apr 3 – Simon Brown
Apr 10 – David Barack
Apr 17 – Kathryn Pendoley
PopRocks is a read-ahead, works-in-progress workshop for graduate students and postdocs in the philosophy of cognitive science and mind. We meet on Fridays to hear and discuss a paper, and try to keep a low-pressure, constructive environment. If that sounds useful to you please get in touch and sign up to present!
Feb 21 – Juliette Vazard
Mar 6 – Stephan Pohl
Mar 27 – David Udell
Apr 3 – Simon Brown
Apr 10 – David Barack
Apr 17 – Kathryn Pendoley