July 5 — Becky Keller – note Friday meeting because of “some kind of American holiday”July 11 — Alex Kiefer – room will be Philosophy 201B (downstairs to the right)July 18 — Kathryn PendoleyJuly 25 — Andrew LeeAug 1 — Simon BrownAug 8 — tbdAug 12ish— Henry ShevlinAug 22 — Andrew Richmond
July 5 — Becky Keller – note Friday meeting because of “some kind of American holiday”July 11 — Alex Kiefer – room will be Philosophy 201B (downstairs to the right)July 18 — Kathryn PendoleyJuly 25 — Andrew LeeAug 1 — Simon BrownAug 8 — tbdAug 12ish— Henry ShevlinAug 22 — Andrew Richmond
July 5 — Becky Keller – note Friday meeting because of “some kind of American holiday”July 11 — Alex Kiefer – room will be Philosophy 201B (downstairs to the right)July 18 — Kathryn PendoleyJuly 25 — Andrew LeeAug 1 — Simon BrownAug 8 — tbdAug 12ish— Henry ShevlinAug 22 — Andrew Richmond
July 5 — Becky Keller – note Friday meeting because of “some kind of American holiday”July 11 — Alex Kiefer – room will be Philosophy 201B (downstairs to the right)July 18 — Kathryn PendoleyJuly 25 — Andrew LeeAug 1 — Simon BrownAug 8 — tbdAug 12ish— Henry ShevlinAug 22 — Andrew Richmond
July 5 — Becky Keller – note Friday meeting because of “some kind of American holiday”July 11 — Alex Kiefer – room will be Philosophy 201B (downstairs to the right)July 18 — Kathryn PendoleyJuly 25 — Andrew LeeAug 1 — Simon BrownAug 8 — tbdAug 12ish— Henry ShevlinAug 22 — Andrew Richmond
July 5 — Becky Keller – note Friday meeting because of “some kind of American holiday”July 11 — Alex Kiefer – room will be Philosophy 201B (downstairs to the right)July 18 — Kathryn PendoleyJuly 25 — Andrew LeeAug 1 — Simon BrownAug 8 — tbdAug 12ish— Henry ShevlinAug 22 — Andrew Richmond
July 5 — Becky Keller – note Friday meeting because of “some kind of American holiday”July 11 — Alex Kiefer – room will be Philosophy 201B (downstairs to the right)July 18 — Kathryn PendoleyJuly 25 — Andrew LeeAug 1 — Simon BrownAug 8 — tbdAug 12ish— Henry ShevlinAug 22 — Andrew Richmond
July 5 — Becky Keller – note Friday meeting because of “some kind of American holiday”July 11 — Alex Kiefer – room will be Philosophy 201B (downstairs to the right)July 18 — Kathryn PendoleyJuly 25 — Andrew LeeAug 1 — Simon BrownAug 8 — tbdAug 12ish— Henry ShevlinAug 22 — Andrew Richmond
This paper is on the topic of deliberative autonomy in (primarily) post-classical Chinese moral epistemology. By “deliberative autonomy,” I mean the epistemic state or achievement in which one’s ethical views or beliefs are those that seem right to oneself and are based on reasons or considerations that one understands for oneself. This is to be contrasted with holding a view or belief based primarily on the authority or expertise of others, without seeing for oneself that the view is correct or why it is correct. The Chinese philosophical tradition is rich in discussion of the nature, value, and function of deliberative autonomy, having much to say both in its defense and against it. I will focus my discussion by looking more closely at what Neo-Confucians have said about a particular term of art, zide 自得 (“getting it oneself”). I translate and discuss some passages on “getting it oneself” in the works and recorded lessons of influential Song, Ming, and Qing Confucians, note different types of deliberative autonomy implied by these passages, and discuss Wm. Theodore de Bary’s famous explication of “getting it oneself.” I consider whether the premium these Confucians placed on zide has the implications for liberal education that de Bary proposes and describe how proponents of zide could respond to formidable and important Xunzian arguments for deference to traditions and expertise.
With responses from: KATJA VOGT (Columbia University)
The Fall dates for the Comparative Philosophy seminar:
September 20 – Justin Tiwald (San Francisco State University)
October 11 – Richard Kim (Loyola University, Chicago
November 8 – Sungmoon Kim (City University of Hong Kong)
December 6 – Paul R. Goldin (University of Pennsylvania)
More details (such as titles, abstracts, and respondents) to follow. Looking forward to seeing you soon.
Hagop Sarkissian
Associate Professor & Chair, Department of Philosophy, The City University of New York, Baruch College
Associate Professor, Department of Philosophy, CUNY Graduate Center
Co-Director, Columbia Society for Comparative Philosophy
The philosophical and psychological literature on well-being tend to focus on the prudential value of positive emotions such as pleasure, joy, or gratitude. But how do the negative emotions such as grief fit into our understanding of well-being? It is often assumed that negative emotions are intrinsically bad far us and that we should work toward eliminating them, especially from the perspective of our own well-being.
In this presentation I want to question this assumption by drawing on the ideas of Zhuangzi (a prominent early Daoist thinker from the 4th Century BCE) to argue that negative emotions are not intrinsically bad for us, and that their prudential value or disvalue is context dependent. Zhuangzi’s outlook, with his focus on the flexibility of perspectives and living according to our natural, spontaneous inclinations, gives us reason to reconsider the role of negative emotions in our lives and how we might think about them in a more constructive way.
With responses from: CHRISTOPHER GOWANS (Fordham University)
The Fall dates for the Comparative Philosophy seminar:
September 20 – Justin Tiwald (San Francisco State University)
October 11 – Richard Kim (Loyola University, Chicago
November 8 – Sungmoon Kim (City University of Hong Kong)
December 6 – Paul R. Goldin (University of Pennsylvania)
More details (such as titles, abstracts, and respondents) to follow. Looking forward to seeing you soon.
Hagop Sarkissian
Associate Professor & Chair, Department of Philosophy, The City University of New York, Baruch College
Associate Professor, Department of Philosophy, CUNY Graduate Center
Co-Director, Columbia Society for Comparative Philosophy
https://www.cbs.columbia.edu/cscp/