Calendar – Blog of Noah Greenstein

Rutgers-Bristol Workshop on the Metaphysical Unity of Science @ Rutgers U, Newark. Conklin Hall 455

Tickets

Jun 10 – Jun 11 all-day

Schedule – June 10th

(Talks are aprox. 45 minutes with 30 minutes for Q&A)

9:00 Mazviita Chirimuuta, Emergence in Science & the Unity of Science

10:15 Joyce Havstad, TBA

12:00 Lunch, Marcus P&B. Part of RUN and Newark’s Community Development.

2:00 Ricki Bliss, Fundamentality: From Epistemology to Metaphysics

3:15 Tuomas Tahko, Laws of Metaphysics for Essentialists

Schedule – June 11th

9:00 Kelly Trodgon, Grounding and Explanatory Gaps

10:15 Stuart Glennan, Rethinking Mechanistic Constitution

12:00 Lunch, Mercato Tomato Pie.

2:00 Alex Franklin, How Do Levels Emerge?

3:15 Ken Aizawa, New Directions in Compositional Explanation: Two Cases Studies

Abstracts

Mazviita Chirimuuta – Emergence in Science & the Unity of Science

This paper considers the implications of recent accounts of emergent phenomena for the question of the unity of the sciences. I first offer a historical account of physicalism in its different guises since the mid 19th century. Two threads connecting these otherwise quite different views have been the rejection of emergent phenomena and the commitment to the unity of science. In section two I provide an exposition of emergence as presented in recent philosophy of science, where the key claim is that “parts behave differently in wholes”, based on the empirical finding of what Gillett (2016) calls “differential powers.” Gillett argues that the empirical evidence does not yet support the strong emergentist claim that there is downward causation or any other form of influence from the whole system to its constituent parts, but that such evidence might be obtained. In section 3 I propose instead that the question of whether or not the finding of differential powers is taken to provide overwhelming evidence for strong emergence depends on the further interpretation of differential powers, and ultimately on very broad metaphysical commitments. The interpretation of differential powers that is most resistant to objections from opponents of strong emergence involves a rejection of substance ontology, and hence the rejection of physicalism. Thus, as I conclude in section 4, philosophers should not wait in expectation for empirical results that will settle the question of whether or not there is strong emergence. I offer a preliminary costs/benefits analysis of the different ontologies of differential powers, intended to aid the reader in their decision over the status of strong emergence. On the most radical interpretation, the usual physicalist conception of the unity of science must be rejected, while a different kind of metaphysical wholism stands in its place.

Joyce Havstad, TBC

Ricki Bliss – Fundamentality: from Epistemology to Metaphysics

In this talk, I explore what might follow for the metaphysics of fundamentality if we take seriously certain reasons to believe there is anything fundamental in the first place.

Tuomas Tahko – Laws of Metaphysics for Essentialists

There is a line of thought gathering momentum which suggests that just like causal laws govern causation, there needs to be something in metaphysics that governs metaphysical relations. Such laws of metaphysics would be counterfactual-supporting general principles that are responsible for the explanatory force of metaphysical explanations. There are various suggestions about how such principles could be understood. They could be based on what Kelly Trogdon calls grounding-mechanical explanations, where the role that grounding mechanisms play in certain metaphysical explanations mirrors the role that causal mechanisms play in certain scientific explanations. Another approach, by Jonathan Schaffer, claims to be neutral regarding grounding or essences (although he does commit to the idea that metaphysical explanation is ‘backed’ by grounding relations). In this paper I will assess these suggestions and argue that for those willing to invoke essences, there is a more promising route available: the unificatory role of metaphysical explanation may be accounted for in terms of natural kind essences.

Kelly Trogdon – Grounding and Explanatory Gaps

Physicalism is the thesis that all mental facts are ultimately grounded by physical facts. There is an explanatory gap between the mental and physical, and many see this as posing a challenge to physicalism. Jonathan Schaffer (2017) disagrees, arguing that standard grounding connections involve explanatory gaps as a matter of course. I begin by arguing that Schaffer and others mischaracterize the explanatory gap between the mental and physical—it chiefly concerns what I call cognitive significance rather than priori implication or related notions. The upshot is that standard grounding connections normally don’t involve explanatory gaps. Then I consider two grounding-theoretic proposals about how to close explanatory gaps in the relevant sense, one involving structural equations (Schaffer 2017) and the other mechanisms (Trogdon 2018). While each of these proposals seeks to illuminate grounding connections, I argue that neither is helpful in closing the explanatory gap between the mental and physical.

Stuart Glennan – Rethinking Mechanistic Constitution

The relationship between a mechanisms and its working parts is known as mechanistic constitution. In this paper we review the history of the mechanistic constitution debate, starting with Salmon’s original account, and we explain what we take to be the proper lessons to be drawn from the extensive literature surrounding Craver’s mutual manipulability account. Based on our analysis, we argue that much of the difficulty in understanding the mechanistic constitution relation arises from a failure to recognize two different forms of mechanistic constitution — corresponding to two different kinds of relationships between a mechanism and the phenomenon for which it is responsible. First, when mechanisms produce phenomena, the mechanism’s parts are diachronic stages of the process by which entities act to produce the phenomenon. Second, when mechanisms underlie some phenomenon, the phenomenon is a activity of a whole system, and the mechanism’s parts are those of the working entities that synchronically give rise to the phenomenon. Attending to these different kinds of constitutive relations will clarify the circumstances under which mechanistic phenomena can be said to occur at different levels.

Alex Franklin – How Do Levels Emerge?

Levels terminology is employed throughout scientific discourse, and is crucial to the formulation of various debates in the philosophy of science. In this talk, I argue that all levels are, to some degree, autonomous. Building on this, I claim that higher levels may be understood as both emergent from and reducible to lower levels. I cash out this account of levels with a case study. Nerve signals are on a higher level than the individual ionic motions across the neuronal membrane; this is (at least in part) because the nerve signals are autonomous from such motions. In order to understand the instantiation of these levels we ought to identify the mechanisms at the lower level which give rise to such autonomy. In this case we can do so: the gated ion channels and pumps underwrite the autonomy of the higher level.

Ken Aizawa – New Directions in Compositional Explanation: Two Cases Studies

The most familiar approach to scientific compositional explanations is that adopted by the so-called “New Mechanists”. This approach focuses on compositional explanations of processes of wholes in terms of processes of their parts. In addition, the approach focuses on the use of so-called “interlevel interventions” as the means by which compositional relations are investigated. By contrast, on the approach I adopt, we see that there are compositional explanations of individuals in terms of their parts and properties of individuals in terms of the properties of their parts. In addition, I draw attention to the use of abductive methods in investigations of compositional relations. I illustrate my approach by use of Robert Hooke’s microscopic investigations of the cork and the development of the theory of the action potential.

Categories: Rutgers Tags: conference epistemology metaphysics science

Apr

6

Mon

Understanding Mathematical Explanation: Uniting Philosophical and Educational Perspectives @ Graduate School of Education, Rutgers

Tickets

Apr 6 – Apr 7 all-day

The workshop is funded by the National Science Foundation (SES-1921688) and is aimed at bringing together academics who study the notion of mathematical explanation from philosophical and from educational/psychological perspectives. The idea is to bring together philosophers of mathematics, epistemologists, psychologists, and mathematics educators, to discuss how developments in their own fields could meaningfully contribute to the work on mathematical explanation where their fields intersect. In particular, we want to explore the ways in which mathematical explanation engenders understanding, by focusing on (1) the relationship between different types of philosophical accounts of mathematical explanation, (2) educational approaches to the characterization of effective explanations in the mathematics classroom, and (3) work at the intersection of these two perspectives.

All speakers:

Mark Colyvan
University of Sydney

Matthew Inglis
Loughborough University

Marc Lange
University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill

Tania Lombrozo
Princeton University

Alexander Renkl
University of Freiburg

Keith Weber
Rutgers University – New Brunswick

Orit Zaslavsky
New York University

Categories: Rutgers Tags: conference education mathematics

Oct

8

Fri

Cognitive Science of Religion Workshop @ ZOOM - see site for details

Tickets

Oct 8 – Oct 10 all-day

Please note: All events are virtual until otherwise stated.

Categories: Rutgers Tags: cognitive science religion

Mar

25

Fri

Cognitive Science of Religion in Philosophy: An Interdisciplinary Workshop @ Zoom, possibly in person

Tickets

Mar 25 – Mar 26 all-day

Location TBA

Categories: Rutgers Tags: cognitive science religion

May

11

Wed

Free Will Workshop: Implications from Physics and Metaphysics @ Rutgers & Zoom

Tickets

May 11 – May 12 all-day

Free Will
Implications from Physics and Metaphysics

The workshop will be hybrid, and anyone interested can participate through Zoom, although there will be limited spots for in-person participants. If you are interested in attending in-person, please reply to this email or write to loewer@philosophy.rutgers.edu.

Barry Loewer (loewer@philosophy.rutgers.edu) Assistant: Diego Arana (diego.arana@rutgers.edu)
Program (All times are EST)

Zoom Link: https://tinyurl.com/freewillzoom

iCal: https://tinyurl.com/freewillical

May 11
10:00am Peter van Inwagen (Notre Dame, Duke)
Ginet’s Principle: Our freedom is the freedom to add to the
given past.
11:30am John Perry (Stanford)
Causation, Entailment and Freedom
3:00pm Barry Loewer (Rutgers)
The Consequence Argument Meets the Mentaculus
4:30pm Carlo Rovelli (Aix-Marseille, UWO)
Free will: Back to Reichenbach

May 12
10:00am Kadri Vihvelin (USC)
Why We can’t Change the Past
11:30am Valia Allori (NIU)
Freedom from the Quantum?
3:00pm Tim O’Connor (Indiana, Baylor)
Top-Down and Indeterministic Agency: Why?
4:30pm Jessica Wilson (Toronto)
Two Routes to the Emergence of Free Will

Categories: Rutgers Tags: free will metaphysics physics

May

20

Fri

Rutgers Religious Epistemology Conference @ Zoom, possibly in person

Tickets

May 20 – May 21 all-day

Contact Toby Bollig

TBA
Location TBD

Categories: Rutgers Tags: epistemology religion

Sep

30

Fri

Evil in Modern Thought at Twenty Workshop @ Hageman Hall - New Brunswick Theological Seminary

Tickets

Sep 30 – Oct 2 all-day

Susan Neiman develops in Evil in Modern Thought: An Alternative History of Philosophy (2002, Princeton: Princeton University Press) a watershed perspective on the longstanding problem of evil, the perniciously difficult to satisfy “need to find order within those appearances so unbearable that they threaten reason’s ability to go on.” The book thereby also presents a radically new perspective on traditional debates within metaphysics. On the occasion of its twentieth anniversary, we gather to celebrate her accomplishment and to advance the research program it reflects. Participants will include, in addition to Neiman herself: Annalise Acorn, Frederick Beiser, Jeremy Bendik-Keymer, Omri Boehm, Dan Brudney, Caroline Bynum, Lorraine Daston, Michael Della Rocca, Wendy Doniger, Wolfram Ellenberger, John Faithful Hamer, Carey Harrison, Patricia Kitcher, Philip Kitcher, Christia Mercer, Cornel West, Allen Wood, and James Wood.

Categories: Rutgers Tags: evil metaphysics religion

Oct

13

Thu

A Philosophical Conference in Honor of Peter van Inwagen’s 80th Birthday @ Seminar Room (524B)

Tickets

Oct 13 – Oct 15 all-day

Distinguished Guest:
Peter van Inwagen (University of Notre Dame)

Speakers:
Aaron Segal (Hebrew University of Jerusalem)
Alex Rosenberg (Duke University)
Anna Marmodoro (Durham University & Oxford University)
Barry Loewer (Rutgers University)
Brian Leftow (Rutgers University)
David Builes (Princeton University)
Dean Zimmerman (Rutgers University)
Ernest Sosa (Rutgers University)
John Hawthorne (University of Southern California & Australian Catholic University)
Laurie Paul (Yale University)
Ted Sider (Rutgers University)
Trenton Merricks (University of Virginia)

The tentative schedule can be found here.

This event is sponsored by the Rutgers Center for the Philosophy of Religion and the Department of Philosophy

Registration

To register, please inform Esther Goh (esther.goh@rutgers.edu) that you plan to attend.

Note: Space is limited, and non-Rutgers attendees must provide proof of vaccination (you can email this to Esther or show us on the day itself) or a negative PCR test.

Travelling to Rutgers (Plane & Train)

The closest airport is EWR (Newark Liberty International Airport). When you are at Newark Airport, just follow the signs to the monorail “airtrain”. The airtrain will take you to the NJ transit train stop, and then you can take the NJ Transit train (Northeast Corridor Line) to New Brunswick station (It costs $14; takes approx. 45mins).

Another two nearby airports are JFK (John F. Kennedy International Airport) and LGA (LaGuardia Airport). Both are in New York. It takes 1hr+ by taxi or 2hr+ by public transport to come to Rutgers.

Hotels

The closest hotels are “Hyatt Regency New Brunswick” (6mins walk from train station) and “The Heldrich Hotel and Conference Center” (8mins walk from train station). You can also check out “Rutgers University Inn and Conference Center” which is further away.

The best rates for the Hyatt can often be found on hotels.com.

Questions

For any inquiries, please contact Esther Goh at esther.goh@rutgers.edu.
(If you are a guest speaker, please contact Frederick Choo at frederick.choo@rutgers.edu for inquiries instead.)

Categories: Rutgers Tags: conference religion

Mar

17

Fri

Rutgers Analytic Theology Seminar @ Seminar Room 524B

Tickets

Mar 17 – Mar 18 all-day

Contact Frederick Choo, fredrick.choo@rutgers.edu

Categories: Rutgers Tags: religion

Apr

15

Sat

Psychology and Epistemology of Religious Experiences Conference @ Center for Philosophy of Religions, Rutgers

Tickets

Apr 15 – Apr 16 all-day

The Center for Philosophy of Religion at Rutgers University is pleased to host an in-person, working-papers conference on the Psychology and Epistemology of Religious Experience. We are seeking abstracts (150-350 words) from those interested in participating. The tentative date is 15-16 April 2023. And the deadline for submission is 28 February 2023. Participants with accepted submissions will be given hotel accommodations and a modest honorarium to help defray travel costs.

Theme

The overall theme of the workshop is the Psychology and Epistemology of Religious Experiences. Philosophers of religion frequently assign religious experiences important epistemic roles, such as justifying religious beliefs. But religious experiences of the kind philosophers are interested in are also studied in other fields as well, such as psychology and religious studies. However, the psychology and epistemology of religious experiences are presumably not independent; studying them together is likely to be insightful in various ways. To that end, we are interested in bringing together scholars working on the psychology and epistemology of religious experiences. Potential topics include:

· The nature of religious experiences

· Taxonomies of religious experiences

· Potential psychological mechanisms and accounts of religious experience

· The relation between perception and religious experiences

· The epistemology of religious experience

· The interactions between the psychology and epistemology of religious experience

· The relation of cognitive science of religion to religious experience

Any proposed papers on these topics, or similar ones, are welcome. Papers exploring interdisciplinary approaches are also welcome.

Instructions

Please submit an abstract (150-350 words), long abstract (350-650 words), or full paper to Timothy Perrine at tp654@scarletmail.rutgers.edu. Submission should be prepared for blind review. In a separate document please provide your name, institutional affiliation (if applicable), and contact information. Submission deadline is 28 February; acceptances will be decided by 5 March; and the workshop will be held 15-16 April.

Categories: Rutgers Tags: cfa conference epistemology mind religion