2/7: Uriah Kriegel Philosophy, Rice University
2/21: Megan Peters Bioengineering, University of California, Riverside Cognitive Sciences, University of California, Irvine
2/28: Iris Berent Psychology, Northeastern University
3/6: Michael Glanzberg Philosophy, Rutgers University
3/20: Sam Coleman Philosophy, University of Hertfordshire
4/3: Cameron Domenico Kirk-Giannini Philosophy, Rutgers University
4/26: Nicholas Shea Institute of Philosophy, University of London Philosophy, University of Oxford
5/8: Diana Raffman Philosophy, University of Toronto
2/7: Uriah Kriegel Philosophy, Rice University
2/21: Megan Peters Bioengineering, University of California, Riverside Cognitive Sciences, University of California, Irvine
2/28: Iris Berent Psychology, Northeastern University
3/6: Michael Glanzberg Philosophy, Rutgers University
3/20: Sam Coleman Philosophy, University of Hertfordshire
4/3: Cameron Domenico Kirk-Giannini Philosophy, Rutgers University
4/26: Nicholas Shea Institute of Philosophy, University of London Philosophy, University of Oxford
5/8: Diana Raffman Philosophy, University of Toronto
2/7: Uriah Kriegel Philosophy, Rice University
2/21: Megan Peters Bioengineering, University of California, Riverside Cognitive Sciences, University of California, Irvine
2/28: Iris Berent Psychology, Northeastern University
3/6: Michael Glanzberg Philosophy, Rutgers University
3/20: Sam Coleman Philosophy, University of Hertfordshire
4/3: Cameron Domenico Kirk-Giannini Philosophy, Rutgers University
4/26: Nicholas Shea Institute of Philosophy, University of London Philosophy, University of Oxford
5/8: Diana Raffman Philosophy, University of Toronto
2/7: Uriah Kriegel Philosophy, Rice University
2/21: Megan Peters Bioengineering, University of California, Riverside Cognitive Sciences, University of California, Irvine
2/28: Iris Berent Psychology, Northeastern University
3/6: Michael Glanzberg Philosophy, Rutgers University
3/20: Sam Coleman Philosophy, University of Hertfordshire
4/3: Cameron Domenico Kirk-Giannini Philosophy, Rutgers University
4/26: Nicholas Shea Institute of Philosophy, University of London Philosophy, University of Oxford
5/8: Diana Raffman Philosophy, University of Toronto
2/7: Uriah Kriegel Philosophy, Rice University
2/21: Megan Peters Bioengineering, University of California, Riverside Cognitive Sciences, University of California, Irvine
2/28: Iris Berent Psychology, Northeastern University
3/6: Michael Glanzberg Philosophy, Rutgers University
3/20: Sam Coleman Philosophy, University of Hertfordshire
4/3: Cameron Domenico Kirk-Giannini Philosophy, Rutgers University
4/26: Nicholas Shea Institute of Philosophy, University of London Philosophy, University of Oxford
5/8: Diana Raffman Philosophy, University of Toronto
2/7: Uriah Kriegel Philosophy, Rice University
2/21: Megan Peters Bioengineering, University of California, Riverside Cognitive Sciences, University of California, Irvine
2/28: Iris Berent Psychology, Northeastern University
3/6: Michael Glanzberg Philosophy, Rutgers University
3/20: Sam Coleman Philosophy, University of Hertfordshire
4/3: Cameron Domenico Kirk-Giannini Philosophy, Rutgers University
4/26: Nicholas Shea Institute of Philosophy, University of London Philosophy, University of Oxford
5/8: Diana Raffman Philosophy, University of Toronto
2/7: Uriah Kriegel Philosophy, Rice University
2/21: Megan Peters Bioengineering, University of California, Riverside Cognitive Sciences, University of California, Irvine
2/28: Iris Berent Psychology, Northeastern University
3/6: Michael Glanzberg Philosophy, Rutgers University
3/20: Sam Coleman Philosophy, University of Hertfordshire
4/3: Cameron Domenico Kirk-Giannini Philosophy, Rutgers University
4/26: Nicholas Shea Institute of Philosophy, University of London Philosophy, University of Oxford
5/8: Diana Raffman Philosophy, University of Toronto
2/7: Uriah Kriegel Philosophy, Rice University
2/21: Megan Peters Bioengineering, University of California, Riverside Cognitive Sciences, University of California, Irvine
2/28: Iris Berent Psychology, Northeastern University
3/6: Michael Glanzberg Philosophy, Rutgers University
3/20: Sam Coleman Philosophy, University of Hertfordshire
4/3: Cameron Domenico Kirk-Giannini Philosophy, Rutgers University
4/26: Nicholas Shea Institute of Philosophy, University of London Philosophy, University of Oxford
5/8: Diana Raffman Philosophy, University of Toronto
Socrates’ close association of madness and philosophy from the Phaedrus’ Palinode has puzzled interpreters. How can philosophy be equated to irrationality? In this paper I argue against interpretations that either deny that the association of madness and philosophy ought to be taken seriously or downplay this association by considering madness as akin to the unreflective inspiration characterizing only the first stages of philosophizing but subsequently overcome by the mature philosopher. I show that the association of madness and philosophy is an integral part of Socrates’ polemics against what he calls “human moderation”, characterized by a cold calculation of costs and benefits. And, moreover, that madness is an ongoing feature of philosophy and of the philosopher, who is never fully in possession of all his rational and cognitive processes but has to constantly work on them in an effort of self-clarification.
External visitors must comply with the university’s guest policy as outlined here: https://www.newschool.edu/covid-19/campus-access/?open=visitors.
Audience members must show proof of a full COVID-19 vaccination series (and booster if eligible), ID, and remain masked at all times.
Professor Williamson will give 3 lectures: September 19, 21, and 23. All will take place in AB-2400 [East Wing] from 4:30-6:30pm.
The lectures will discuss problems in the methodology of contemporary philosophy. Although philosophy without use of counterexamples would be a disaster, the way they are currently handled is naïve. In particular, it is too vulnerable to fake counterexamples generated by more or less universal human heuristics.
Lecture One: Heuristics [9/19]
Human cognition, from sense perception to abstract reflection, frequently employs heuristics, quick, easy, efficient, and imperfectly reliable ways of solving problems. To a neglected extent, philosophical problems and paradoxes from reliance on the outputs of fallible heuristics. This will be illustrated with examples involving vagueness, conditionals, belief ascription, truth and falsity, and reasons aggregation. Potential lessons for philosophical method will be discussed.
Lecture Two: Overfitting [9/21]
Overfitting is a well-recognized methodological problem in natural science, where use of models with too many degrees of freedom leads to unstable theorizing and failure to detect errors in the data. Overfitting is also a major but ill-recognized methodological problem in philosophy, exacerbated by its reliance on heuristics. General intellectual tendencies conducive to overfitting in philosophy will be discussed.
Lecture Three: Hyperintensionality [9/23]
The ‘hyperintensional revolution’ proclaims that central metaphysical distinctions cannot be captured in modal terms since they are sensitive to differences between necessary equivalents. Such hyperintensionalism fits the profile of overfitting. It is motivated by case judgments that are explicable as results of a fallible heuristic and it leads to models with too many degrees of freedom.