Calendar

2/7: Uriah Kriegel Philosophy, Rice University

2/21: Megan Peters Bioengineering, University of California, Riverside Cognitive Sciences, University of California, Irvine

2/28: Iris Berent Psychology, Northeastern University

3/6: Michael Glanzberg Philosophy, Rutgers University

3/20: Sam Coleman Philosophy, University of Hertfordshire

4/3: Cameron Domenico Kirk-Giannini Philosophy, Rutgers University

4/26: Nicholas Shea Institute of Philosophy, University of London Philosophy, University of Oxford

5/8: Diana Raffman Philosophy, University of Toronto

2/7: Uriah Kriegel Philosophy, Rice University

2/21: Megan Peters Bioengineering, University of California, Riverside Cognitive Sciences, University of California, Irvine

2/28: Iris Berent Psychology, Northeastern University

3/6: Michael Glanzberg Philosophy, Rutgers University

3/20: Sam Coleman Philosophy, University of Hertfordshire

4/3: Cameron Domenico Kirk-Giannini Philosophy, Rutgers University

4/26: Nicholas Shea Institute of Philosophy, University of London Philosophy, University of Oxford

5/8: Diana Raffman Philosophy, University of Toronto

2/7: Uriah Kriegel Philosophy, Rice University

2/21: Megan Peters Bioengineering, University of California, Riverside Cognitive Sciences, University of California, Irvine

2/28: Iris Berent Psychology, Northeastern University

3/6: Michael Glanzberg Philosophy, Rutgers University

3/20: Sam Coleman Philosophy, University of Hertfordshire

4/3: Cameron Domenico Kirk-Giannini Philosophy, Rutgers University

4/26: Nicholas Shea Institute of Philosophy, University of London Philosophy, University of Oxford

5/8: Diana Raffman Philosophy, University of Toronto

2/7: Uriah Kriegel Philosophy, Rice University

2/21: Megan Peters Bioengineering, University of California, Riverside Cognitive Sciences, University of California, Irvine

2/28: Iris Berent Psychology, Northeastern University

3/6: Michael Glanzberg Philosophy, Rutgers University

3/20: Sam Coleman Philosophy, University of Hertfordshire

4/3: Cameron Domenico Kirk-Giannini Philosophy, Rutgers University

4/26: Nicholas Shea Institute of Philosophy, University of London Philosophy, University of Oxford

5/8: Diana Raffman Philosophy, University of Toronto

2/7: Uriah Kriegel Philosophy, Rice University

2/21: Megan Peters Bioengineering, University of California, Riverside Cognitive Sciences, University of California, Irvine

2/28: Iris Berent Psychology, Northeastern University

3/6: Michael Glanzberg Philosophy, Rutgers University

3/20: Sam Coleman Philosophy, University of Hertfordshire

4/3: Cameron Domenico Kirk-Giannini Philosophy, Rutgers University

4/26: Nicholas Shea Institute of Philosophy, University of London Philosophy, University of Oxford

5/8: Diana Raffman Philosophy, University of Toronto

The current pandemic has focused attention on the techniques used by epidemiologists and other non-experimental scientists to infer causal hypotheses from correlational data. I have previously argued* that we need to explain these techniques by reducing causal relationships to dependencies in systems of structural equations with probabilistically independent exogenous variables. In this talk I shall aim to use this account to cast light on (a) single-case counterfactual dependence and actual causation, (b) the content and practical relevance of generic causal claims like “smoking causes cancer”, (c) the temporal asymmetry of causation, and (d) the proper understanding of rational action under risk.

*In particular, I’ve argued this in http://weebly-file/1/8/5/5/18551740/stat_nat_csn_monist.pdf. I will also be giving a talk on it at the CUNY Logic and Metaphysics workshop on Monday 7 March 1615-1815.

The talk will be on Zoom. All are welcome to attend!

The zoom link will be distributed through the MAPS mailing list. If you are not on the MAPS mailing list and would like to receive the Zoom link for the talk, please email nyphilsci@gmail.com.

Jacob Soll, in conversation with Pierre Force, John Shovlin, Carl Wennerlind, and Emmanuelle Saada

After two government bailouts of the U.S. economy in less than twenty years, free market ideology is due for serious reappraisal. In Free Market: the History of an Idea, Jacob Soll details how we got to this current crisis, and how we can find our way out by looking to earlier iterations of free market thought. Contrary to popular narratives, early market theorists believed that states had an important role in building and maintaining free markets. But in the eighteenth century, thinkers insisted on free markets without state intervention, leading to a tradition of ideological brittleness. That tradition only calcified in the centuries that followed. Tracing the intellectual evolution of the free market from Cicero to Milton Friedman, Soll argues that we need to go back to the origins of free market ideology in order to truly understand it—and to develop new economic concepts to face today’s challenges.

Jacob Soll is professor of history and accounting at the University of Southern California. He has been awarded numerous prestigious prizes including two NEH Fellowships, the Jacques Barzun Prize, a Guggenheim Fellowship, and, in 2011, the MacArthur Fellowship. He also advises political and financial leaders across the globe to promote accounting standards and financial transparency.

Joining Jacob Soll to discuss his book will be: Pierre Force, Professor of French and History at Columbia; John Shovlin, Professor of History at NYU; and Carl Wennerlind, Professor of History at Barnard College. Emmanuelle Saada, Professor of History and French at Columbia, will moderate the discussion.

This event is co-sponsored by the Maison Française and the Department of History.

Professor Williamson will give 3 lectures: September 19, 21, and 23. All will take place in AB-2400 [East Wing] from 4:30-6:30pm.

The lectures will discuss problems in the methodology of contemporary philosophy. Although philosophy without use of counterexamples would be a disaster, the way they are currently handled is naïve. In particular, it is too vulnerable to fake counterexamples generated by more or less universal human heuristics.

Lecture One: Heuristics [9/19]

Human cognition, from sense perception to abstract reflection, frequently employs heuristics, quick, easy, efficient, and imperfectly reliable ways of solving problems. To a neglected extent, philosophical problems and paradoxes from reliance on the outputs of fallible heuristics. This will be illustrated with examples involving vagueness, conditionals, belief ascription, truth and falsity, and reasons aggregation. Potential lessons for philosophical method will be discussed.

Lecture Two: Overfitting [9/21]

Overfitting is a well-recognized methodological problem in natural science, where use of models with too many degrees of freedom leads to unstable theorizing and failure to detect errors in the data. Overfitting is also a major but ill-recognized methodological problem in philosophy, exacerbated by its reliance on heuristics. General intellectual tendencies conducive to overfitting in philosophy will be discussed.

Lecture Three: Hyperintensionality [9/23]

The ‘hyperintensional revolution’ proclaims that central metaphysical distinctions cannot be captured in modal terms since they are sensitive to differences between necessary equivalents. Such hyperintensionalism fits the profile of overfitting. It is motivated by case judgments that are explicable as results of a fallible heuristic and it leads to models with too many degrees of freedom.

Professor Williamson will give 3 lectures: September 19, 21, and 23. All will take place in AB-2400 [East Wing] from 4:30-6:30pm.

The lectures will discuss problems in the methodology of contemporary philosophy. Although philosophy without use of counterexamples would be a disaster, the way they are currently handled is naïve. In particular, it is too vulnerable to fake counterexamples generated by more or less universal human heuristics.

Lecture One: Heuristics [9/19]

Human cognition, from sense perception to abstract reflection, frequently employs heuristics, quick, easy, efficient, and imperfectly reliable ways of solving problems. To a neglected extent, philosophical problems and paradoxes from reliance on the outputs of fallible heuristics. This will be illustrated with examples involving vagueness, conditionals, belief ascription, truth and falsity, and reasons aggregation. Potential lessons for philosophical method will be discussed.

Lecture Two: Overfitting [9/21]

Overfitting is a well-recognized methodological problem in natural science, where use of models with too many degrees of freedom leads to unstable theorizing and failure to detect errors in the data. Overfitting is also a major but ill-recognized methodological problem in philosophy, exacerbated by its reliance on heuristics. General intellectual tendencies conducive to overfitting in philosophy will be discussed.

Lecture Three: Hyperintensionality [9/23]

The ‘hyperintensional revolution’ proclaims that central metaphysical distinctions cannot be captured in modal terms since they are sensitive to differences between necessary equivalents. Such hyperintensionalism fits the profile of overfitting. It is motivated by case judgments that are explicable as results of a fallible heuristic and it leads to models with too many degrees of freedom.