Apr
17
Fri
Chinese Philosophy and Virtue Epistemology @ Brower Commons Conference Rooms A & B
Apr 17 all-day

Rutgers Workshop on Chinese Philosophy (RWCP) was launched in 2012. Co-directed by Tao Jiang, Dean Zimmerman and Stephen Angle, RWCP is designed to build a bridge between Chinese philosophy and Western analytic philosophy and to promote critical engagement and constructive dialogue between the two sides, with the hope of bringing the study of Chinese philosophy into the mainstream of philosophical discourse within the Western academy. It is run every other year, usually in late spring.

5th Rutgers Workshop on Chinese Philosophy: Chinese Philosophy and Virtue Epistemology
The 5th RWCP will be held on Friday, April 17, 2020. In this one-day workshop, six scholars of Chinese philosophy will engage two leading virtue epistemologists, Ernest Sosa and Linda Zagzebski. The program and papers will be available in the spring of 2020, one month before the workshop. RSVP will become available at that time as well, and it is required for attendance. Please stay tuned.

FAQs

1. Where can I park?
Details will be provided as we get closer to the day of the workshop.
2. How can I get to the event on public transportation?
Take the NJ Transit Northeast Corridor Line to New Brunswick (njtransit.com). Make sure the train stops at New Brunswick as some might skip it during rush hours.

Contact Ms. Nancy Rosario (nr531@religion.rutgers.edu)

Co-sponsored by Rutgers Global-China Office and the Confucius Institute.

Apr
18
Sat
Mind, Body, Passion. NYC Workshop in Early Modern Philosophy @ Fordham U. Philosophy Dept.
Apr 18 – Apr 19 all-day

The workshop, which is now in its 10th year, aims to foster exchange and collaboration among scholars, students, and anyone with an interest in Early Modern Philosophy. This year’s workshop will focus on the topic of “Mind, Body, Passion” in Early Modern Philosophy (roughly the period from 1600-1800).

We welcome submissions on the conference topic, which may be broadly construed to include mind-body identity, mind-body interaction, embodiment, philosophy of emotion, aesthetics, etc. For consideration, please submit abstracts of 250-300 words to newyorkcityearlymodern@gmail.com no later than December 31, 2019.

Keynote speakers:

New York University
University of Toronto at Mississauga

Organisers:

Fordham University
Bar-Ilan University, Ramat Gan
Fordham University
May
2
Sat
Epictetus Conference @ Columbia U Philosophy Dept. 716
May 2 – May 3 all-day

Contact Professor Wolfgang Mann for more info.

Mar
4
Fri
Rachel Barney (U Toronto), “The Ethics and Politics of Plato’s Noble Lie” @ Zoom, possibly in person
Mar 4 @ 3:30 pm – 5:30 pm

Abstract. The Noble Lie proposed by Plato for the Just City in Republic III has been much misunderstood. Its agenda is twofold: to get the citizens of the City to see their society as a natural entity, with themselves as all ‘family’ and akin; and to get the Guardians in particular to make class mobility, on which the justice of the City depends, a top priority. Since the second is taken to depend on the first, the Lie passage amounts to an argument (1) that the survival of a just community depends on the existence of social solidarity between elite and mass, which allows for full class mobility and genuine meritocracy; (2) that this solidarity in turn depends on an ideology of natural unity; and (3) that such ideologies are always false. So the Lie really is a lie, but a necessary one; as such it poses an awkward ethical problem for Plato and, if he is right, for our own societies as well.

 

Presented by SWIP-NYC

Apr
29
Fri
Rutgers Epistemology Conference 2022 @ Hyatt Regency New Brunswick
Apr 29 – Apr 30 all-day

The REC is a pre-read conference. The papers will be made available on this website on April 15.

PROGRAM

Friday, April 29, 2022

  • 1:30 – 3:15 pm
    • Jeremy Fantl (Calgary)
      • Chair: TBD
  • Coffee Break
  • 3:45 – 5:30 pm
    • Thomas Kelly (Princeton)
      • Chair: TBD
  • Dinner
  • 7:30 – 9:15 pm
    • Jane Friedman (NYU)
      • Chair: TBD
  • Reception 9:30 – 11:00 PM

 

Saturday, April 30, 2022

  • 9:30 – 11:15 am
    • Peter Graham (UCR)
      • Chair: TBD
  • Coffee Break
  • 11:45 – 1:30 pm      Winner of the Young Epistemologist Prize
    • Mona Simion (Glasgow)
      • Chair: TBD
  • Lunch
  • 2:45 – 4:30 pm
    • Kathrin Glüer (Stockholms Universitet) and Asa Wikforss (Stockholms Universitet)
      • Chair: TBD

Discussants

  • Patrick Greenough (University of St. Andrews)
  • Sarah Paul (NYU-Abu Dhabi)
  • Declan Smithies (OSU)
  • Julia Staffel (University of Colorado)

 

Participants (to be updated soon)

Chris Copan, Andy Egan, Megan Feeney, Peter Klein, Matthew McGrath, Susanna Schellenberg, Ernie Sosa

 

The REC is a pre-read conference, so papers are to be read in advance. There is no registration fee for the conference, but please notify Chris Copan, the conference manager, if you plan to attend by sending an email to rutgersepistemologyconference@gmail.com. If you wish to participate in the meals, please send a check made out to “Rutgers University” to the conference manager by April 15 ($80 if you are a faculty member or a postdoc; $60 if you are a graduate student or an undergraduate): Chris Copan; REC; 106 Somerset St, 5th Floor; New Brunswick, NJ 08901.

 

May
20
Fri
Rutgers Religious Epistemology Conference @ Zoom, possibly in person
May 20 – May 21 all-day

Contact Toby Bollig

TBA
Location TBD

Nov
17
Thu
Rachana Kamtekar: What makes right acts right? A Stoic answer to Ross’s question @ Wolff Conference Room/D1103
Nov 17 @ 6:00 pm – 8:00 pm

What makes right acts right? A Stoic answer to Ross’s question.

When W.D. Ross poses the question, “what makes right acts right?” (The Right and the Good ch. 2), he is asking a question that is prior to the deliberative question, “how do I determine the right thing to do?” The Stoics recognize this: in De Officiis 1.7, Cicero says that every inquiry about duty has two parts: (1) a theoretical part concerned with the end of goods and evils, which addresses such matters as whether all duties are perfect, whether some are more important than others, and what are the kinds of duties, and (2) a practical part which sets out rules (praecepta) by which our conduct can be made to conform with the end.  This paper focuses on (1) and in particular asks Ross’s question about Stoic right actions (kathêkonta).

 

The endpoint of Stoic deliberation is determining what token action is the right action.  The paper begins with the Stoic distinction between a thing’s choiceworthiness, its intrinsic disposition to elicit a choice response in a suitable subject, and its possession being to-be-chosen. The determination of what is to-be-done is made by weighing against each other all the values of the relevant action types specified by their content (the so-called ‘intermediate actions’) that are in accordance with nature, as Stoic value theory says that according with nature is an objective reason to do an action.  What constitutes the rightness of the token right action, and is given in its reasonable defense, is the same as what constitutes the rightness of a perfect (katorthôma) action.   The Stoic distinction between right and perfect action depends on the action’s moral goodness—not rightness—which is due to its causal origin.

Presented by Professor Rachana Kamtekar (Cornell University)

Dec
12
Mon
50 Years of Naming and Necessity @ Philosophy Dept., CUNY Graduate Center
Dec 12 – Dec 13 all-day

This conference celebrates the 50th anniversary of the first publication of Saul Kripke’s masterpiece, Naming and Necessity, by showcasing new work on a range of topics on which it has had a lasting influence. These topics include, but are not limited to: the nature of names and natural kind terms; the failure of the description or cluster/description theories; the distinction between metaphysical necessity and epistemic apriority; empty names; the metaphysics of essence and origin; the nature of modality and possible worlds; conceivability and the epistemology of modality; the role of philosophical intuition; and the mind-body problem.

Dates: 12th and 13th December, from 9am to 5pm.

Venue: The CUNY Graduate Center, 365 5th Avenue, New York, New York.

Format: hybrid

Registration: for both online and in person attendance, please register by the 28th of November, 2022 at https://forms.gle/Jbr3uaFx1ZwRxJpZ7.

Speakers:

Rutgers University – Newark
Stockholm University
Universitat Autonoma de Barcelona
University of Southern California
Providence College
ICREA And University Of Barcelona
Trinity College, Dublin
University of Edinburgh
University of California at Santa Barbara
University of California at Santa Barbara
University of Sussex
Stockholm University
Simon Fraser University
Massachusetts Institute of Technology

Organisers:

University of Sussex
Stockholm University
Providence College
CUNY Graduate Center

 

Feb
23
Thu
Thinking About Death in Plato’s Euthydemus. @ Wolff Conference Room/D1103
Feb 23 @ 6:00 pm – 8:00 pm

Book discussion on Gwenda-lin Grewal’s, Thinking About Death in Plato’s Euthydemus. A Close Reading and New Translation (OUP 2022)

 

Speakers:

Gwenda-lin Grewal (NSSR)
Cinzia Arruzza (NSSR)
Nicholas Pappas (CUNY)

 

Thinking of Death places Plato’s Euthydemus among the dialogues that surround the trial and death of Socrates. A premonition of philosophy’s fate arrives in the form of Socrates’ encounter with the two-headed sophist pair, Euthydemus and Dionysodorus, who appear as if they are the ghost of the Socrates of Aristophanes’ Thinkery. The pair vacillate between choral ode and rhapsody, as Plato vacillates between referring to them in the dual and plural number in Greek. Gwenda-lin Grewal’s close reading explores how the structure of the dialogue and the pair’s back-and-forth arguments bear a striking resemblance to thinking itself: in its immersive remove from reality, thinking simulates death even as it cannot conceive of its possibility. Euthydemus and Dionysodorus take this to an extreme, and so emerge as the philosophical dream and sophistic nightmare of being disembodied from substance. The Euthydemus is haunted by philosophy’s tenuous relationship to political life. This is played out in the narration through Crito’s implied criticism of Socrates-the phantom image of the Athenian laws-and in the drama itself, which appears to take place in Hades. Thinking of death thus brings with it a lurid parody of the death of thinking: the farce of perfect philosophy that bears the gravity of the city’s sophistry. Grewal also provides a new translation of the Euthydemus that pays careful attention to grammatical ambiguities, nuances, and wit in ways that substantially expand the reader’s access to the dialogue’s mysteries.

Mar
24
Fri
Śrīharṣa on the Indefinability of Knowledge. Nilanjan Das (U Toronto) @ Faculty House, Columbia
Mar 24 @ 5:30 pm – 7:30 pm

In Sanskrit epistemology, philosophers are preoccupied with the notion of pramā. A pramā, roughly, is a mental event of learning or knowledge-acquisition. Call any such mental event a knowledge-event. In A Confection of Refutation (Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhādya), the 12th century philosopher and poet Śrīharṣa argued that knowledge-events are indefinable. Any satisfactory (and therefore non-circular) definition of knowledge-events will have to include an anti-luck condition that doesn’t appeal back to the notion of learning or knowledge-acquisition itself. But there is no such anti-luck condition. What is novel about Śrīharṣa’s argument is that it is motivated by his commitment to a certain “knowledge first” approach to epistemology: the view that knowledge-events are epistemically prior to other non-factive mental states and events. On this view, when we are trying to determine whether an agent has undergone a knowledge-event, we don’t initially ascribe to them some other non-factive mental event, and then check if that event meets some further conditions (like truth or reliability) necessary for it to count as a knowledge-event; rather, we treat certain mental events by default as knowledge-events until a defeater comes along.  Surprisingly, Śrīharṣa argues that this kind of “knowledge first” epistemology should give us reason to doubt whether our ordinary attributions of knowledge-events are reliably tracking any sui generis psychological kind. In this talk, I reconstruct Śrīharṣa’s position.

With responses from Rosanna Picascia (Swarthmore College)

RSVP is required for dinner. Dinner will take place at a nearby restaurant. Please contact Lucilla at lm3335@columbia.edu for further information.