PopRocks is a read-ahead, works-in-progress workshop for graduate students and postdocs in the philosophy of cognitive science and mind. We meet on Fridays to hear and discuss a paper, and try to keep a low-pressure, constructive environment. If that sounds useful to you please get in touch and sign up to present!
Feb 21 – Juliette Vazard
Mar 6 – Stephan Pohl
Mar 27 – David Udell
Apr 3 – Simon Brown
Apr 10 – David Barack
Apr 17 – Kathryn Pendoley
PopRocks is a read-ahead, works-in-progress workshop for graduate students and postdocs in the philosophy of cognitive science and mind. We meet on Fridays to hear and discuss a paper, and try to keep a low-pressure, constructive environment. If that sounds useful to you please get in touch and sign up to present!
Feb 21 – Juliette Vazard
Mar 6 – Stephan Pohl
Mar 27 – David Udell
Apr 3 – Simon Brown
Apr 10 – David Barack
Apr 17 – Kathryn Pendoley
PopRocks is a read-ahead, works-in-progress workshop for graduate students and postdocs in the philosophy of cognitive science and mind. We meet on Fridays to hear and discuss a paper, and try to keep a low-pressure, constructive environment. If that sounds useful to you please get in touch and sign up to present!
Feb 21 – Juliette Vazard
Mar 6 – Stephan Pohl
Mar 27 – David Udell
Apr 3 – Simon Brown
Apr 10 – David Barack
Apr 17 – Kathryn Pendoley
A number of authors have pointed out that the standard arguments for perception’s having nonconceptual content tell us nothing about the content of a state per se, but only instead about the sorts of capacities a subject must have in order to be in some state (i.e., whether the subject need or need not possess the specifying concepts in order to be in some state). Others have argued in response that the only reason for two states to require different conceptual capacities of the subject is precisely because they have different sorts of contents, and so there is no substantive difference between a ‘content’ view and a ‘state’ view. Here, I present evidence for states that do, in fact, share the same content but differ in the required conceptual capacities: exogenous perceptual states, and endogenous, voluntarily produced perceptual states. I argue that this functional difference—voluntary versus involuntary production—constitutes the difference in concept-dependence. I then look to three possibilities for how this claim could affect our understanding of the relationship between cognition and perception.
Brooklyn Public Philosophers is a forum for philosophers in the greater Brooklyn area to discuss their work with a general audience, hosted by the Brooklyn Public Library. Its goal is to raise awareness of the best work on philosophical questions of interest to Brooklynites, and to provide a civil space where Brooklynites can reason together about the philosophical questions that matter to them.
If you’re interested in finding out more, or if you’d like to give a talk, please e-mail Ian Olasov at his first and last name at gmail.com.
How does the brain cope with Complexity? How do we make decisions when confronted with practically infinite streams of information?
The conference showcases cutting edge research on these questions in Neuroscience and Psychology (neural mechanisms of cognitive control, exploration, decision-making, information demand, memory and creativity), Computer Science (artificial intelligence of curiosity and intrinsic motivation) and Economics (decision making and information demand). Alongside formal presentations, the conference will encourage ample interactions among faculty, students and postdocs through informal discussions and poster presentations.
Submissions for poster presentations and travel awards are due February 15, 2023. Please visit the call for submissions for complete requirements.
Event Information
Free and open to the public. Registration is required and will open shortly. All in-person attendees must follow Columbia’s COVID-19 policies. Visitors will be asked to provide proof of COVID-19 vaccination. Online attendees will receive a Zoom link. Please email events@zi.columbia.edu with any questions.
Nietzsche (1844-1900) is one of the few philosophers who have an intimate connection to music. This connection has much to do with his early music education. His contemporaries testify that he was a good pianist. His musical ambition, or his musical daimon, urged him to compose music, although he had no training in this area. Most of his compositions are from his late teens; his earliest inspirations are Beethoven, Mozart, Haydn, Schubert, Schumann and Wagner. His compositions were gathered together and published by Curt Paul Janz in Friedrich Nietzsche, Der musikalische Nachlass. Nietzsche’s music is available in several productions. However, Nietzsche did not follow a musical path and decided to become a philologist and dedicated his life to writing and philosophy.
Nietzsche’s background in music, on the other hand, influenced his way of thinking and writing. All of these interesting areas between music, literature, and philosophy and Nietzsche’s relationship to music understood on a broad spectrum have been explored by many Nietzsche scholars including Georges Liébert, Graham Parkes, Francois Noudelmann, Stefan Lorenz Sorgner and others and in the anthology, An Anthology on Nietzsche and Music: Philosophical Thoughts and Musical Experiments, edited by the presenters of today’s event. This event is dedicated to the exploration of this relationship between Nietzsche and music.