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Logic & Metaphysics Workshop
4:15 pm
Logic & Metaphysics Workshop
@ CUNY Grad Center, rm 3309
Mar 5 @ 4:15 pm – 6:15 pm
Feb 26 Martin Pleitz, Muenster Mar 5 Vera Flocke, NYU Mar 12 Roy Sorensen, WUSTL Mar 19 Alex Citkin, Private Researcher Mar 26 Chris Scambler, NYU Apr 2 SPRING RECESS. NO MEETING Apr 9 Greg Restall, Melbourne Apr 16 Daniel Nolan, Notre Dame Apr 23 Mel Fitting, CUNY Apr 30 Sungil Han, Seoul National May 7 Andreas Ditter, NYU May14 Rohit Parikh
The Metasemantics of Indefinite Extensibility – Vera Flocke (NYU)
4:15 pm
The Metasemantics of Indefinite Extensibility – Vera Flocke (NYU)
@ CUNY Grad Center, rm 3309
Mar 5 @ 4:15 pm – 6:15 pm
Indefinite extensibility is the thesis that any domain of quantification can always be expanded. But how is the possibility of expanding domains of quantification reflected in the semantics of quantified sentences? This paper discusses the relevant meta-semantic options within a framework that distinguishes between semantic values and assertoric contents. This choice of a framework is independently motivated, helps received accounts of indefinite extensibility to escape weighty objections and adds to the available metasemantic options. I[...]
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“Sextus Empiricus’ Fourth Conditional and Containment Logic” Yale Weiss (CUNY)
2:00 pm
“Sextus Empiricus’ Fourth Conditional and Containment Logic” Yale Weiss (CUNY)
@ CUNY Grad Center, rm 8203
Mar 8 @ 2:00 pm – 4:00 pm
In a famous passage from Outlines of Pyrrhonism, Sextus Empiricus presents four different accounts of the conditional in increasing strength. Contemporary analogues have been identified (subject to various degrees of controversy) for the first three, but the last, which even fails to satisfy A>A, has proved elusive. In this talk, I discuss ways of modeling this heterodox conditional. Taking a cue from Sextus, I regard the characteristic feature of this conditional as one of proper[...]
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Cognitive Science Speaker Series
1:00 pm
Cognitive Science Speaker Series
@ CUNY Grad Center, rm 7-102
Mar 9 @ 1:00 pm – 3:00 pm
February 9: Jessie Munton Philosophy, New York University “How Long Is ‘a’ Visual Experience?” March 9: Taylor Webb Neuroscience Institute and Cognitive Science, Princeton University Title TBA April 13: Eleni Manolakaki Philosophy and History of Science, University of Athens “Propositions as Measures of Mind” For spring 2018, the CUNY Cognitive Science Speaker Series will meet once a month. We’ll return to weekly talks in fall 2018. All talks are at the CUNY Graduate Center, 365[...]
The Paradox of Apology – Francey Russell (Yale)
4:00 pm
The Paradox of Apology – Francey Russell (Yale)
@ room D1206
Mar 9 @ 4:00 pm – 6:00 pm
Apology constitutes an essential part of the hard work of being an imperfect moral agent, over time and amongst others. Apology is one component of our “reparative responsibilities” (Bell 2012), of responding well to one’s past wrongdoing, and is more broadly part of the ongoing effort to come to terms with what one’s deeds will mean for one’s life (Williams 69). So how is this work achieved? In this paper I argue that the[...]
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Confessing to a Superfluous Premise – Roy Sorensen (WUSTL)
4:15 pm
Confessing to a Superfluous Premise – Roy Sorensen (WUSTL)
@ CUNY Grad Center, rm 3309
Mar 12 @ 4:15 pm – 6:15 pm
In a hurried letter to beleaguered brethren, Blaise Pascal (1658) confesses to a lapse of concision: “I have made this longer than usual because I have not had time to make it shorter.” Pascal’s confession was emulated with the same warmth as philosophers now emulate the apology introduced by D. C. Mackinson’s “The Preface Paradox”. Could Pascal’s confession of superfluity be sound? Pascal thinks his letter could be conservatively abridged; the shortened letter would be[...]
Logic & Metaphysics Workshop
4:15 pm
Logic & Metaphysics Workshop
@ CUNY Grad Center, rm 3309
Mar 12 @ 4:15 pm – 6:15 pm
Feb 26 Martin Pleitz, Muenster Mar 5 Vera Flocke, NYU Mar 12 Roy Sorensen, WUSTL Mar 19 Alex Citkin, Private Researcher Mar 26 Chris Scambler, NYU Apr 2 SPRING RECESS. NO MEETING Apr 9 Greg Restall, Melbourne Apr 16 Daniel Nolan, Notre Dame Apr 23 Mel Fitting, CUNY Apr 30 Sungil Han, Seoul National May 7 Andreas Ditter, NYU May14 Rohit Parikh
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Admissibility of Multiple-Conclusion Rules of Logics with the Disjunction Property (Alex Citkin)
4:15 pm
Admissibility of Multiple-Conclusion Rules of Logics with the Disjunction Property (Alex Citkin)
@ CUNY Grad Center, rm 3309
Mar 19 @ 4:15 pm – 6:15 pm
I study admissible multiple-conclusion rules of logics having the meta-disjunction expressible by a finite set of formulas. I show that in such logics the bases of admissible single- and multiple-conclusion rules can be converted into each other. Since these conversions are constructive and preserve cardinality, it is possible to obtain a simple way of constructing a base of admissible single-conclusion rules, by a given base of admissible multiple-conclusion rules and vice versa. Because the proofs[...]
Logic & Metaphysics Workshop
4:15 pm
Logic & Metaphysics Workshop
@ CUNY Grad Center, rm 3309
Mar 19 @ 4:15 pm – 6:15 pm
Feb 26 Martin Pleitz, Muenster Mar 5 Vera Flocke, NYU Mar 12 Roy Sorensen, WUSTL Mar 19 Alex Citkin, Private Researcher Mar 26 Chris Scambler, NYU Apr 2 SPRING RECESS. NO MEETING Apr 9 Greg Restall, Melbourne Apr 16 Daniel Nolan, Notre Dame Apr 23 Mel Fitting, CUNY Apr 30 Sungil Han, Seoul National May 7 Andreas Ditter, NYU May14 Rohit Parikh
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Logic & Metaphysics Workshop
4:15 pm
Logic & Metaphysics Workshop
@ CUNY Grad Center, rm 3309
Mar 26 @ 4:15 pm – 6:15 pm
Feb 26 Martin Pleitz, Muenster Mar 5 Vera Flocke, NYU Mar 12 Roy Sorensen, WUSTL Mar 19 Alex Citkin, Private Researcher Mar 26 Chris Scambler, NYU Apr 2 SPRING RECESS. NO MEETING Apr 9 Greg Restall, Melbourne Apr 16 Daniel Nolan, Notre Dame Apr 23 Mel Fitting, CUNY Apr 30 Sungil Han, Seoul National May 7 Andreas Ditter, NYU May14 Rohit Parikh
Mathematical Truth is Historically Contingent – Chris Scambler (NYU)
4:15 pm
Mathematical Truth is Historically Contingent – Chris Scambler (NYU)
@ CUNY Grad Center, rm 3309
Mar 26 @ 4:15 pm – 6:15 pm
In this talk I will defend a view according to which certain mathematical facts depend counterfactually on certain historical facts. Specifically, I will sketch an alternative possible history for us in which (I claim) the proposition ordinarily expressed by the English sentence “there is a universal set” is true, despite its falsity in the actual world. Logic & Metaphysics Workshop Feb 26 Martin Pleitz, Muenster Mar 5 Vera Flocke, NYU Mar 12 Roy Sorensen, WUSTL[...]
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