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Eastern Study Group of the North American Kant Society
Eastern Study Group of the North American Kant Society @ Columbia University Philosophy Dept. 716
May 4 – May 5 all-day
The Eastern Study Group of the NAKS invites submissions for its 15th annual meeting to take place at Columbia University on Friday and Saturday, May 4–5, 2018. Our host this year is Professor Patricia Kitcher. Conference Flyer Keynote Speakers: Stephen Engstrom (Pitt) Paul Guyer (Brown) Submissions of detailed abstracts (1,000 words) or papers (no more than 5,000 words, including notes and references) should be prepared for blind review as PDF files. Please include a word[...]
Psychologism and Behaviourism Revisited – Tim Crane (CEU) 12:30 pm
Psychologism and Behaviourism Revisited – Tim Crane (CEU) @ NYU Philosophy Dept. rm 202
May 4 @ 12:30 pm – 2:00 pm
Gottlob Frege famously argued that we should always ‘always separate sharply the psychological from the logical, the subjective from the objective’. While analytic philosophers have generally followed this advice when discussing logic and mathematics (in their rejection of ‘psychologism’ about these things), they have not followed it when discussing the psychological itself. It might be thought that if psychologism was true of anything, it is true of the psychological. But much 20th and 21st century[...]
David Barack (Columbia) 1:00 pm
David Barack (Columbia) @ CUNY Grad Center, rm 7113
May 4 @ 1:00 pm – 3:00 pm
“Reasoning often involves searching for information relevant to answering some question or determining the truth value of some proposition. Starting from a set of propositions, akin to a patch of resources in the environment, reasoners draw inferences, akin to harvesting resources from that patch. Reasoners forage through the space of propositions to find potentially informative patches, each of which promises multiple paths of inferences. Once reasoning from a premise patch begins, reasoners follow a path of inferences[...]
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Buddhist Perfectionism and Kantian Liberalism on Self-Constitution – David Cummiskey (Bates College) 5:30 pm
Buddhist Perfectionism and Kantian Liberalism on Self-Constitution – David Cummiskey (Bates College) @ Columbia Religion Dept. rm 101
May 11 @ 5:30 pm – 7:30 pm
At the core of Kantian liberalism is a conception of the independent autonomous subject. On the other hand, the most central and distinguishing feature of Buddhist philosophy is the doctrine of no-self. It thus seems that Buddhists should reject Kantian liberalism. My larger project develops the connections between Buddhist perfectionism, liberalism, and principles of justice. In this paper, I focus on Buddhist and Kantian conceptions of self-constitution, but my ultimate concern is the significance of[...]
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Philosophy of Psychology Workshop 1:00 pm
Philosophy of Psychology Workshop @ Columbia University Philosophy Dept. 716
May 25 @ 1:00 pm – 3:00 pm
PoPRocks (formerly known as ‘WoPoP’) is an ongoing series in the NYC area for early career researchers – typically grad students and postdocs – working on philosophy of psychology/mind/perception/cognitive science/neuroscience/… . We usually meet roughly once every 2 weeks to informally discuss a draft paper by one of our members. Typically presenters send a copy of their paper around 1 week in advance, so do join the mailing list (by emailing poprocksworkshop@gmail.com or one of[...]
Philosophy of Psychology Workshop – Stephan Pohl 1:00 pm
Philosophy of Psychology Workshop – Stephan Pohl @ Columbia University Philosophy Dept. 716
May 25 @ 1:00 pm – 3:00 pm
In perception, the world is represented by me. So goes a very naive thesis about perception. Yet when faced with phenomena of hallucination and illusion many theorists come to accept that in perception one merely represents a possible world that can more or less accurately match the actual world. Recently, a much more radical thesis arose: Perception is probabilistic. This would mean that in perception one does not simply represent one possible world, but one[...]
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