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4:15 pm
CANCELLED – Coverage-Reliance Ignorance, Eric Bayruns Garcia (CUNY) – Logic & Metaphysics Workshop
@ CUNY Grad Center, 7314
CANCELLED – Coverage-Reliance Ignorance, Eric Bayruns Garcia (CUNY) – Logic & Metaphysics Workshop
@ CUNY Grad Center, 7314
Mar 4 @ 4:15 pm – 6:15 pm
Meeting Cancellation: The CUNY Graduate Center will be closed on Monday, March 4th. Therefore, the Logic and Metaphysics Workshop will not be meeting. There is no meeting I argue that racial injustice can make a subject’s news sources unreliable because of the effect of (1) racial prejudice and (2) society’s unjust structure on the news-gathering-and-disseminating processes a subject relies on. I assume that societies with entrenched racial injustice have widespread racial prejudices and that these[...]
4:15 pm
Logic & Metaphysics Workshop
@ CUNY Grad Center, 7314
Logic & Metaphysics Workshop
@ CUNY Grad Center, 7314
Mar 4 @ 4:15 pm – 6:15 pm
The Logic and Metaphysics Workshop will be meeting on Mondays from 4:15 to 6:15 in room 7314 of the Graduate Center, CUNY (365 5th Avenue). The (provisional) schedule is as follows: Feb 4. Melvin Fitting, CUNY Feb 11. Benjamin Neeser, Geneva Feb 18. GC CLOSED. NO MEETING Feb 25. Achille Varzi, Columbia Mar 4. Eric Bayruns Garcia, CUNY Mar 11. Jeremy Goodman, USC Mar 18. Romina Padro, CUNY Mar 25. Kit Fine, NYU Apr 1. Elena[...]
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4:30 pm
Typicality of Worlds and the Metaphysics of Laws. Dustin Lazarovici (UNIL)
@ NYU, room 110
Typicality of Worlds and the Metaphysics of Laws. Dustin Lazarovici (UNIL)
@ NYU, room 110
Mar 5 @ 4:30 pm – 6:30 pm
What are laws of nature? The predominant view in contemporary philosophy of science is the Humean `best system account’ which holds that the laws of nature are merely descriptive, an efficient summary of contingent regularities that we find in the world. Using the concept of typicality, I will spell out a common anti-Humean intuition into a precise argument: A typical Humean world wouldn’t have any law-like regularities to begin with. Thus (I will argue), Humean[...]
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4:30 pm
On Frege’s Assimilation of Sentences with Names, Dongwoo Kim (CUNY)
@ CUNY Grad Center, 6495
On Frege’s Assimilation of Sentences with Names, Dongwoo Kim (CUNY)
@ CUNY Grad Center, 6495
Mar 7 @ 4:30 pm – 6:30 pm
I shall discuss some of the issues concerning a notorious doctrine of Frege that sentences are names of truth-values. I am interested in a problem raised by Kripke that the doctrine obscures the distinction between judgeable and unjudgeable contents. I shall present what I take to be Frege’s account of judgeable content. A proper expression of a judgeable content, for Frege, is susceptible to an analysis into a predicate and an argument-word, where a predicate[...]
7:30 pm
I, holobiont. Are you and your microbes a community or a single entity? – Derek Skillings
@ Dweck Center, Brooklyn Public Library
I, holobiont. Are you and your microbes a community or a single entity? – Derek Skillings
@ Dweck Center, Brooklyn Public Library
Mar 7 @ 7:30 pm – 9:00 pm
When we’re asked to give examples of philosophical questions, we’re likely to think of questions that are very, very old. Is the physical world all there is? How should I live? How do we know what we know? But some philosophical problems are quite new, made possible or urgent by new developments in science and culture. These are often the most exciting problems to think through. On March 7th at 7:30 PM, Derek Skillings joins[...]
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12:00 pm
Gabriele Pulcini (New University of Lisbon): From Complementary Logic to Proof-Theoretic Semantics
@ Columbia U Philosophy Dept. 716
Gabriele Pulcini (New University of Lisbon): From Complementary Logic to Proof-Theoretic Semantics
@ Columbia U Philosophy Dept. 716
Mar 8 @ 12:00 pm
Two proof-systems P and P* are said to be complementary when one proves exactly the non-theorems of the other. Complementary systems come as a particular kind of refutation calculi whose patterns of inference always work by inferring unprovable conclusions form unprovable premises. In the first part of my talk, I will focus on LK*, the sequent system complementing Gentzen’s system LK for classical logic. I will show, then, how to enrich LK* with two admissible[...]
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