Category Archives: metaphysics
Achilles glanced up from his writing atop the Tortoise and exclaimed, “Look! The Hare has caught up.”
“No,” said the Tortoise apprehensively, “that isn’t the Hare, but the Hare’s all too clever cousin, the HareLoon.”
“A real HareLoon! I’ve only ever seen them in pictures.”
“Don’t get so worked up. She is always in a hurry but I can never tell if she is coming or going.”
“Ah, but you should know the HareLoon coming and the HareLoon going are one and the same,” said the HareLoon. She then faced Achilles, “I heard that Tortoise had you write many logical steps after starting with a mere three.”
With a wan smile Achilles murmured, “We’ve moved on from that now…”
“Yes” said the Tortoise firmly. “Have you heard of Moore’s Proof of the External World? It is just as short as the three lines of Euclid:
(A) Here is a Hand.
(B) Hands are external things.
(Z) The external world exists.
Achilles said, “We are now in agreement that Z follows logically from A and B. But…”
“But only if we accept A and B, does Z follow,” the Tortoise interjected. “However, I’m skeptical that hands are real at all.”
“Whatever do you mean?” asked the HareLoon, looking rather concerned for Achilles.
“Well, I might just be dreaming that there is a Hand in front of me. Or I could have eaten something disagreeable that is making me imagine things. Or someone is playing a trick on me.” The Tortoise continued, “I need a further statement to guarantee A:
(C) I am not being fooled into thinking a Hand is here.
Achilles cringed, palm to face.
“Fair enough, and I think I know where you are going with this,” said the HareLoon. “But before we worry about the External world, have you a proof of the Internal World?”
“What do you mean: Proof of the Internal World?” asked Achilles.
The HareLoon queried, “Let me ask you first: Would you know a HareLoon if you saw one? If so, please tell me how.”
In an official sounding voice the Tortoise recited: “The chief characteristic of a HareLoon is that it appears to be a Hare at some times, and appears to be a Loon at others.”
“Excellent,” replied the HareLoon. “Would you agree that the HareLoon does not itself change when it takes on these different guises? That is: the appearance of the Loon and the appearance of the Hare are in the thoughts of the beholder.”
“I suppose… The change is in the onlooker,” agreed the Tortoise.
“Then,” continued the HareLoon,
(A’) Here is a HareLoon.
(B’) HareLoons are internal things.
(Z’) The internal world exists.
“I distinctly remember Moore talking about hands and not HareLoons,” grumbled the Tortoise.
“Perhaps, but unlike hands you cannot be fooled into thinking HareLoons exist! We exist when, without change, we can appear to be a Hare or a Loon. Since we have agreed that this change is in your head, you can’t be mistaken about us switching in appearance between Hare or Loon. Hence when you think you see a HareLoon, you do see a HareLoon!
“Very Clever!” returned the Tortoise. “But what we want is the external — not internal — world. You’ve just argued yourself into my head and out of external existence. If you are only in my thoughts, it is a quick matter of logic to say that you aren’t anywhere eles.”
“Why Tortoise, that is the nicest thing you’ve ever said to me! To think, you’ve kept me in mind and maintained my existence, all these years. I should be flattered — or flattened, like you. I would take this paper thin existence (Cogito me papyrum esse, ergo sum) but I don’t think I need to any longer.
“Answer me this: Who lives in this internal world? I’m here, and so are you! We have just agreed that I exist by you thinking, Cogito Ergo Es, and this is just the same as you existing by you thinking, Cogito Ergo Sum. So if I am a figment of your imagination, then so are you.”
“I am most certainly not a figment of my own imagination! You always were Loony, using Hairy reasoning.” said the indignant Tortoise.
“I don’t want to deny my existence any more than you yours, but if, as a quick matter of logic, you exclude others from existing, it loses its sense to say that you exist, either. The only other thing that could have gone wrong is B’, that HareLoons are internal things. So we now have:
(A’) Here is a HareLoon.
(B’’) HareLoons are external things.
(Z) The external world exists.
Achilles shook his head, “You should have known, Tortoise… you can be in your house, but you’re still outside. If only your cousin were here, the Mock-Turtle would say: that while Achilles skill kills and the Tortoise disorders us (what tsuris!), the HareLoon’s Hume’s heir.”
 Carroll, Lewis. (1895) What the Tortoise Said to Achilles. Mind 4, No. 14: 278-280.
 Bouwsma, O. K. (1949). Descartes’ evil genius. Philosophical Review 58 (2):141-151.
 Wittgenstein, Ludwig (1953/2003). Philosophical Investigations: The German Text, with a Revised English Translation. Malden, Ma, Blackwell Pub.
Relevant section §398 quoted below.
“But when I imagine something, or even actually see objects, I have got something which my neighbour has not.” — I understand you. You want to look about you and say: “At any rate only I have got THIS.” — What are these words for? They serve no purpose. — Can one not add: “There is here no question of a ‘seeing’ — and therefore none of a ‘having’ — nor of a subject, nor therefore of T either”? Might I not ask: In what sense have you got what you are talking about and saying that only you have got it? Do you possess it? You do not even see it. Must you not really say that no one has got it? And this too is clear: if as a matter of logic you exclude other people’s having something, it loses its sense to say that you have it.
But what is the thing you are speaking of? It is true I said that I knew within myself what you meant. But that meant that I knew how one thinks to conceive this object, to see it, to make one’s looking and pointing mean it. I know how one stares ahead and looks about one in this case — and the rest. I think we can say: you are talking (if, for example, you are sitting in a room) of the ‘visual room’. The ‘visual room’ is the one that has no owner. I can as little own it as I can walk about it, or look at it, or point to it. Inasmuch as it cannot be any one else’s it is not mine either. In other words, it does not belong to me because I want to use the same form of expression about it as about the material room in which I sit. The description of the latter need not mention an owner, in fact it need not have any owner. But then the visual room cannot have any owner. “For” — one might say — “it has no master, outside or in.”
Think of a picture of a landscape, an imaginary landscape with a house in it. — Someone asks “Whose house is that?” — The answer, by the way, might be “It belongs to the farmer who is sitting on the bench in front of it”. But then he cannot for example enter his house.
You’ve tossed the grin out with the cat.
Are you good at metaphysics? How good are you at metaphysics?
When I consider these questions, the only sure thing is that there is no objective measure of metaphysical proficiency. I can’t even imagine standards by which we could judge it. It would be at least as hard to estimate as intelligence, and anyway, I doubt smarts correlates with metaphysical skill. Lots of smart people have said a lot of ridiculous things. I like to think that I’m better than the next guy, because, well, I like to think that. This reminded me of the old highway driving razor:
Have you ever noticed that anybody driving slower than you is an idiot, and anyone going faster than you is a maniac? — George Carlin
I’d amend it to say:
Everyone who is more dogmatic than you is an idiot and everyone who is less dogmatic than you is a maniac.
Perhaps we are the metaphysicians we think we are, but it wouldn’t hurt to be a bit more metaphysically charitable.
Given an Object Oriented Ontology ethics can present a problem.* It is not obvious how to fit ethics into an object oriented view: even if objects have ethical properties, ethics itself has to be considered just as arbitrary as any other property. One could, of course, hold some Deontological, Consequentialist or other ethical viewpoint, but this position would have to be justified on other grounds, since O.O.O. is silent on the matter. Hence having ethics as an ad hoc ontological addition is a problem because it shows that Object Oriented Philosophy is inherently lacking an important part of human experience.
To achieve a more comprehensive viewpoint, while still being object oriented, a different ethical strategy must be taken.
Consider that the objects of our reality are both overdetermined and underdetermined (overmined/ undermined in Harman-y terms). This means that no matter how we think about our reality, there are multiple underlying phenomena and multiple overarching phenomena that can be understood to govern every part of our world. Often this is used to develop an argument supporting O.O.O., but I want to develop a different consequence.
By permanently securing multiple fundamental reasons for every phenomenon, no single reason has ultimate sway. We must, in principle, be ontologically humble.
This means that however much we learn about ourselves, there will always be more, multiple explanations, theories, and phenomena; we are forever interesting to ourselves.
To live with the expanding enormity of human experience, while never being able to fully come to terms with it, then we must forever re-explain and rediscover those unknown parts of ourselves. To do this we need charity. Charity for others, charity for ourselves, and charity for that which we do not understand, because we already know we do not fully understand. Having charity — extra time, patience and effort — when we explore (speculate on?) our reality lets us extend our experience into the unknown (the chaos, if you will), even in the face of theories that should completely determine phenomena. This gives us the opportunity to explore ourselves, others and other ways of life, to find new objects and phenomena, and new ways to be charitable, ad infinitum.
Therefore the same dilemma that Object Oriented Philosophy presents as its ontological support, also yields support for a concept of charity.
Charity, as described, has ethical teeth. Determining the charitable thing to do in a given situation tracks, at least to my mind, a typical normative ethical stance. Like deontology it can be seen as having space for moral indifference and praiseworthiness: not all acts are governed by charity, though certain actions can be seen as especially charitable. Also it has built in brakes. The principle of ontological humility prevents us from naively applying our personal understanding of charity to others, which means it would be wrong, for example, to donate one person’s organs (without their permission) to save others.
Granted, more work will have to be done to flesh out these ideas, but my hope is that this outline shows that charity can provide a promising start to an integrated ethics within Object Oriented Philosophy.
* I’m not sure how it happened, but my metaphysics has lead me to a similar position as the Object Oriented Philosophers, at least ontologically. So for the course of this post, I’m wearing my Object Oriented Philosopher Hat. My apologies if the arguments above are unique to my theories and not OOP in general, though this post makes me suspect I am not that far off.
Assume space-time is quantized. This would mean that space-time is broken up into discrete bits. It then follows that time is broken up into discrete bits.
This disagrees with basic experience: we can start counting time at any arbitrary point. “Now” could be any time whatsoever. Moreover, we run our physical experiments at any given point; we don’t have to wait to start our clocks.
But what if our ability to run experiments at any given point is just an illusion of our universe being broken up into such tiny bits that we just don’t notice the breaks?
Could we design an experiment to test when we can run experiments?
If time is continuous, we would never find any point at which we could not run an experiment. If time is not continuous, though, we would likewise never find any point at which we could not run an experiment, since all experiments would use clocks that start within that lockstep quantized time.
Hence we are unable to tell the difference between quantized and continuous time such that it always appears continuous.
However, even if time is continuous in this fashion, measurement of time is not. Since there is a lower limit to what we can distinguish between two different times, even if we are free to start measuring whenever we want, all subsequent measurements are physically dependent upon that initial fixed point. The second measurement must be outside the uncertainty associated with the initial measurement (the clock start) and the third must be outside the second, etc. Therefore all physically useful measurements of time (counting past zero, that is) are inherently physically quantized by their dependence upon the instantiation of measurement and limits of uncertainty.
If time is both continuous and discontinuous in this fashion, then so is all space-time.
This leads to the question of which is ontologically prior: if you hold that our reality is defined by what we can measure, then the universe is quantized and our experience pigeonholed; if you hold that our reality is defined by our phenomenal experience, then the universe is continuous and measurement is pigeonholing.
Either way it is a question of the metaphysics — not physics — of space-time. And without a way to distinguish between these options, no physical experiment will be able to settle the debate either, since we could always be chasing our metaphysical tails.
I’ve mulled over this issue concerning the logical limits of what can be measured by physics for years, but I never developed any conclusions. However, there has recently been discussion of the feasibility of a tabletop search for Planck scale signals. This nifty experiment seems deviously simple with the potential for novel results, so go check it out if you haven’t heard of it yet, for example in this discussion. One issue that the experiment bears upon is the continuity of space-time at the Planck Scale. My worry is that the above metaphysical distinction between counting zero and counting past zero may trip up the physicists’ search for the continuity or discontinuity at the fundamental levels of matter.
Quentin Meillassoux’s After Finitude
© has a very interesting discussion of Hume’s problem, Kant’s Copernican Revolution, the principle of sufficient reason and the relationship between dogmatism and fanaticism. Any one of his analyses on these topics makes the book worthwhile, but I’d like to focus on something different: the fundamental assumption of facticality.
Meillassoux has a factical view of the world, meaning that the world is made up of facts. He does not argue that facticality is a necessary position, though, but as it seems convenient for the rest of his arguments and has an impressive pedigree, he seems to feel this is good enough. He claims this pedigree stems from both Wittgenstein and Heidegger, among others.
This leads to two ways of criticizing his position: either by attacking the ground of the facticality of the world using Meillassoux’s own strategies or by using historic attacks on facticality of the world and applying them to Meillassoux’s position.
First let’s take a look at some historical arguments:
I do not know if Heidegger ever repudiated his views on this subject, but it was Wittgenstein of the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus
© that propounded a factical world. Wittgenstein did repudiate this work, though it is not necessarily the factical world view that became offensive to later Wittgenstein.* However, what we do have is this quote from the Introductions (p. x) of the Philosophical Investigations ©:
For since beginning to occupy myself with philosophy again, sixteen years ago, I have been forced to recognize grave mistakes in what I wrote in that first book [the Tractatus]. I was helped to realize these mistakes—to a degree which I myself am hardly able to estimate—by the criticism which my ideas encountered from Frank Ramsey, with whom I discussed them in innumerable conversations during the last two years of his life.
Ramsey’s review of the Tractatus was published in October 1923 in Mind /
©, and Ramsey died in 1930. Hence Ramsey’s review is five years prior to these discussions. Yet I do not know of any record of later conversations, so this Mind review remains the best source for Ramsey’s thoughts on the Tractatus. The task for me will be to show how his criticisms, which are directed at the Tractatus, can also be applied to the factical world view.
Ramsey criticized Wittgenstein’s concept of logical constants. Lighting upon 5.512
That which denies in ‘~p ‘ is not ‘~,’ but that which all signs of this notation, which deny p, have in common. Hence the common rule according to which ‘~p,’ ‘~~~p,’ ‘~p ∨ ~p,’ ‘~p & ~p,’ etc. etc. (to infinity) are constructed. And this which is common to them all mirrors denial.”
Ramsey says (p. 472)
I cannot understand how it mirrors denial. It certainly does not do so in the simple way in which the conjunction of two propositions mirrors the conjunction of their senses. This difference between conjunction and the other truth-functions can be seen in the fact that to believe p and q is to believe p and to believe q; but to believe p or q is not the same as to believe p or to believe q, nor to believe not p as not to believe p.
This criticism applies to the interpretation of logical constants within the Tractatus. Ramsey is arguing that Wittgenstein’s picture theory breaks down in its interpretation of logical constants since negation is not simply represented by a picture if pictures including negation also mirror denial. The situation for disjunction is worse, since it makes even less sense to say what a disjunction mirrors. The upshot is that there is more going on with logical constants than simply describing how facts can be broken down.
We can extend this criticism to the ontological, factical situation: In a factical world, everything can be otherwise. But if our logical constants cannot be pictured in certain ways — if our logical constants resist being viewed in certain ways since they are not strictly like other facts — then there are restrictions on our logical understanding of the world. Hence the factical world cannot be completely changeable: it is governed by the complex internal structures of logic. This means there are restrictions on what can be otherwise in terms of logic and a meta-restriction on how things can be otherwise: everything can still be otherwise, but not in every possible way.
This can be seen in another criticism of Ramsey’s. He said the Tractarian position commits one to holding, “the only necessity is that of tautology, the only impossibility that of contradiction.” (p. 473) He continues:
For example, considering between in point of time as regards my experiences; if B is between A and D and C between B and D, then C must be between A and D; but it is hard to see how this can be a formal tautology.
In terms of facticality we are dealing with absolute contingency, so everything must either be entirely contingent, or there is something necessary. But what this example shows is that if there is any sort of ordering that we can give to the world, then there are going to be necessarily existing facts about that world. So, again, everything could be different, but not in every possible way.
Worse, for QM, is that the factical position may then beg the question about what grounds for our scientific practice, since this is the sort of mathematical structure he wants to use to justify our understanding of the arche-fossil. So if there are mathematical systems built into the logical structure of facticality, then he will have to abandon his current project and start again without assuming facticality.
These two examples from Ramsey point out that the factical world is not an innocent assumption.
Now for an internal criticism of facticity.
Can facticity resist Meillassoux’s speculative move? If we can speculate on whether the world is factical or not, then must we still accept that the world is factical? I can’t see how since there is nothing about speculating on the factical world that should lead back to it; the factical world view was adopted on the principle that it worked with radical contingency. Also, seeing as Meillassoux is willing to apply speculation to his problems means that it is an available strategy to apply to his solutions. Hence we may engage in speculation before we accept facticity.
This leads to a dilemma of choosing between radical contingency and speculation: if we are speculative, then we no longer can accept the factical world and radical contingency theory based on it, but if we are radically contingent, then we accept the factical world and reject the speculative move, undermining the rest of the theory. Hence Meillassoux wielded too strong a weapon: using speculation without restriction is too dangerous for facticity, and this collapses the rest of his theory.
* Hintikka has put forward an analysis /
© of Wittgenstein’s rejection of the Tractatus during 1929 based on his dated notebooks and other records, such as Vienna Circle commentary. He maintains that Wittgenstein repudiated the phenomenological view of language but not the picture view (facticality) of the world, at least at that time. See page 167.
There are different sorts of constraints on thought. We forget things, we fail to infer consequences of our beliefs and we have features of perception, like blind spots, that affect our understanding of our surroundings. We also can be greatly affected by our emotions: when we are angry — when we see red — we are unable to see the anything but the things that are making us mad; when we are infatuated we are, conversely, unable to see anything wrong with our object of desire.
This account of emotional states — moods — is interesting because moods affect our overall reasoning ability. Given one mood, we will be able to make certain inferences; given another, we will make different inferences. Moreover, what seems to be a rational inference in one mood may be irrational in another mood.
At this point we have thought, which is comprised of our knowledge, perception and deductions we make, and mood, which modifies and constrains thought. If we consider the situation over time, then at any point a person has a history of thoughts and moods, which has led up to the current state, and a potential future of moods and thoughts based on where that person is now. Going from one mood to another, or one thought to another, can only be done within a limited range, i.e. no thoughts or moods can be completely detached from prior thoughts or moods. This gives us a perspective on the relation between rationality, consciousness and thought:
Considering a person’s consciousness at some point, we can map what we consider rational and irrational based upon the potential mood and thought changes. Any possible future belief (a combination of thought and mood) will be a combination of changes in prior moods and thoughts. Beliefs that require too great a change in both thought or mood may be outside the realm of rationality for a person, while beliefs that require little effort will fall within the realm of rationality. Hence, the rationality cone
The Future Rationality Cone illustrates how, given changes in thought or mood, a person’s beliefs can become different from their current beliefs. The edge of the cone is the limit of what that person could possibly rationally believe: anything outside the edge requires too great a jump in thought or mood from where they currently are. Any point inside the cone represents a set of beliefs that the person could rationally have, given different circumstances. The bottom half of diagram shows the past rational states that could have led up to the current state, as represented by the Past Rationality Cone.
If the above scheme is familiar, it is because it is modeled on the Light Cone from physics; the diagram is from the linked Wikipedia page. I always found it fascinating that the light cone implies that there is part of the universe immediately surrounding each of us that we can never physically access. Likewise, there are thoughts and moods that are just like our own that appear irrational to us—even if they are not—because they fall outside our capabilities. Other people could, however, have these thoughts because their rationality cones are not exactly aligned with our own, or they started from another location, which enabled them to access that part of the mental universe.
There is no such thing as a private reality. By private reality I mean any portion of reality that you alone can experience, that no one else could possibly understand.
There is, however, reality that is yet unexperienced and unknown to you. Others may have experienced it before you, like explorers who have been to a far away place. If a philosopher is clever, it is possible that she found a way to imbue her words with such an experience. Since there are no private realities, it is also possible that you may be able to extract those experiences.
The allure of philosophy is then the allure of the unknown, the exotic and unexplored. To be charitable is to approach philosophy in search of some yet unknown bit of reality.
Under these circumstances it is futile to give specific instructions on how to be charitable; each of us must understand how to prepare ourselves for adventuring beyond the relative comfort of what we know.
If anything, have faith in yourself and do not make assumptions (even charitable ones) about what you are doing.
There is, however, reality that is yet unexperienced and unknown to you. Others may have experienced it before you, like explorers who have been to a far away place. If the philosopher was clever, it is possible that she found a way to imbue her words with that experience. Since there are no private realities, it is also possible that you may be able to extract those experiences.
The allure of philosophy is then the allure of the unknown, the exotic and unexplored. To be charitable is to approach a philosophical treatise in search of some yet unknown bit of reality.
Under these circumstances it is futile to give specific instructions on how to be charitable; each of us must understand how to prepare ourselves for adventuring beyond the relative confort of what we know.
If anything, have faith in yourself and do not make assumptions (even ones considered to be charitable) about what you are studying.
Of late I’ve become increasingly concerned with the meaning of identity. When we say, ‘x = x,’ we don’t mean that the x on the left is exactly identical to the x on the right because the x on the left is just that, on the left, and the x on the right is on the right, not the left. Since equality would be useless without having 2 different objects (try to imagine the use of a reflexive identity symbol, i.e., one that for whatever object it is applies to, indicates that the object is identical with itself), there is something mysterious about the use of identity.
But what is the mystery? It cannot be anything to do with the subjects being declared identical: these objects are arbitrary to the particular topic being discussed. For example if I say ‘the morning star = the evening star’ then we are talking about planets, and if I say that ‘3 = y’ then I am talking about numbers. The identity sign is the same in both, even though the objects being discussed are rather different.
It is easy enough to believe that by paying attention to the different objects being declared identical we can know how to act (some sort of context principle *cringe*). But this doesn’t address the question specifically: although we can know how to use the identity symbol in specific instances, this tells us nothing about how identity works or what it means.
Take a look at this:
The picture is the same save for location on the webpage.
But what if we call the one on the left a duck and the one on the right a rabbit: what is different? The features obviously don’t change, only the way we are seeing (perceiving? apprehending? looking at? interpreting?) the two images.
(Triple bonus points to anyone who can look at the two pictures at once and see one as a duck and the other as a rabbit. Hint- it is easier for me to do it if I try to see the one on the left as a rabbit and the one on the right as a duck… focus on the mouths.)
In this example, as opposed to the others discussed above, a decision was required to be made – to see one picture one way and the other another way – before the differences even existed. Now, in the above examples it appeared that there was a difference of knowledge: at one point we didn’t know that the evening star and morning star were one and the same, or that y was equal to 3. This isn’t the case when looking at identical duckrabbit pictures because there is nothing about the two pictures that is different; the difference is entirely in the mind.
Let me make a suggestion about how to describe the phenomenon of being able to see one image two different ways: the image can be instantiated in two different ways, i.e. it has an associated universe with a population of two. There are two possible descriptions associated with this image and until we make a decision about how to describe it, the image is like an uninstantiated formula.
Identity, then, is an indication that the two associated objects are things that can be generalized to the same formula. The picture of the duck and the picture of the rabbit can be called identical because they both have a single general formula (the duckrabbit picture) that can be instantiated into either. The identity symbol indicates that the two associated objects are two instantiations of the same general thing, be it a number, planet or image (but not objects in space-time because that would be self-contradictory… space-time and instantiation, a topic for another day).
How identity works can now be identified: it is to instantiate and generalize. Consider the mystery of how we see the duckrabbit one way or the other: no one can tell you how you are able to see the image one way or the other. However, you are able to instantiate the image in one way and then another, and recognize that both the duck and rabbit are shown by the same image.
Instantiation and generalization are skills and the identity symbol between the two images above indicates that you have to use that skill to generalized both to one formula. Most of the time it is non-trivial to instantiate or generalize in order to show two things (formulas) to be equal. In the case of the duckrabbit it is trivial because the work went into the instantiation process (to see the images one way or the other); in the other examples the situation is reversed, such that we had the instantiations but not the general formula. In all cases, though, only when we can go back and forth between different instantiations and a single generalization do we claim two things identical.
Two posts ago I claimed that
The goal of science is, therefore, to separate the settled from the anomalous.
So what is the settled? What is the anomalous? How are they separated?
If we take these concepts to be fundamental then we are unable to analyze the concepts of settled, anomalous and separation scientifically: if they are at the bottom of all science, then everything within science depends upon them.
How then to understand?
At the bottom of it all is our ability to understand. We learn and we understand. With this comes the ability to determine what we believe we understand and what we do not: For certain things we have reasons that explain those phenomena and for other things we will not have reasons nor explanations.
These abilities are not based in science; they are metaphysical and logical. Claiming that you cannot understand (in general) is paradoxical. If you claim to not understand what it is to understand, then you must understand what it is not to understand. But if you understand what it is not to understand, then you must know what it is to understand not understanding. So you must understand what it to understand. But then you are denying being able to understand… Hence it is nonsensical to deny understanding understanding.
Therefore we get understanding, not understanding and the difference on non-scientific grounds. Insofar as reasons and explanations are part of understanding, we get them too.
How do we understand what is settled and what is anomalous?
If you claim that it is not settled what it means to be settled then you must have known what it is to be not settled, that is, it is settled what it is to be not settled. Then you must know what it is to be settled, i.e. it is settled. But then you claim that it is not settled… Therefore you cannot claim that what it means for something to be settled is not settled.
If we assume that not settled and anomalous are identical in meaning (not settled = anomalous; not anomalous = settled) then we have nearly all the concepts we need.
But here comes the hard part: how do we separate the settled from the not settled?
Well, since we already have understanding, this requires doing actual science, as in creating a theory and then going and seeing if that theory actually makes something that was anomalous no longer so by predicting it accurately. This isn’t the post for me to get down off my metaphysical cloud, so Good Luck, you’re on your own (for now at least).