09.23.11
Posted in game theory, logic, science at 1:09 am by nogre
If we try to represent tossing a coin or a die, or picking a card out of a deck at random, in logic, how should we do it?
Tossing a coin might look like:
Toss(coin) → (Heads or Tails)
Tossing a die might be:
Toss(die) → (1 or 2 or 3 or 4 or 5 or 6)
Picking a card:
Pick(52 card deck) → (1♣ or 2♣ or … or k♥)
This begs asking, do these statements make sense? For instance look what happens if we try to abstract:
∀x Toss(x)
such that ‘Toss’ represents a random selection of the given object.
But this is weird because Toss is a randomized function and x is not selected randomly in this formula. Perhaps if we added another variable, we could generate the right sort of function:
∀y ∃x Toss(yx)
Then x would be a function of y: we would select x with respect to y. The problem is still that a Toss involves randomness. So this setup is incorrect because treating x as a function of y is not randomized, because y is not random.
How can we represent randomness in logic?
As noted, functions alone will not work. Variables and interpreted objects cannot invoke randomness. Perhaps we can modify some part of our logic to accommodate randomness. The connectives for negation and conjunction haven’t anything to do with randomness either.
But, if we use the game theoretic interpretation of logic, then we can conceive of each quantifier as representing a player in a game. Players can be thought of as acting irrationally or randomly.
Therefore, let’s introduce a new quantifier: Я. Я is like the other quantifiers in that it instantiates a variable.
- Яx T(x)
- Tb
However, Я is out of our (or anyone’s) control. It does instantiate variables when it is it’s turn (just like other quantifiers) but it instantiates randomly. So we have three players, Abelard, Eloise and Random (or the Verifier, Falsifier and Randomizer).
But more is still needed. We need a random selection between specific options, be it between heads and tails, 1-6, cards, numbers, or anything else. One way of doing this would be to create a special domain just for the random choices. Я would only instantiate from this domain, and if there are multiple random selections, we will require multiple indexed domains.
Hence, given Di(Heads, Tails),
Яix
represents a coin flip since Я randomly instantiates out of the domain containing only Heads and Tails.
(aside:
I prefer to use an artifact of Independence Friendly logic, the dependence indicator: a forward slash, /. The dependence indicator means that the quantifier only depends on those objects, variables, quantifiers or formulas specified. Hence
Яx/(Heads, Tails)
means that the variable x is randomly instantiated to Heads or Tails, since the only things that Яx is logically aware of are Heads and Tails. Therefore this too represents a coin flip, without having multiple domains.)
Now that we have an instantiation rule for Я we also need a negation rule for it. If some object is not selected at random, then it must have been individually selected. In this case the only other players that could have selected the object are ∀ and ∃. Hence the negation rule for Я is just like the negation rule for the other quantifiers: negating a quantifier means that a different player is responsible for instantiation of the variable. If neither player is responsible, it can be considered random: ¬Яx ↔ (∀x or ∃x). We can leave the basic negation rule for ∀ and ∃ the way it is.
Therefore, given the additions of the new quantifier and domain (or slash notation), we can represent randomness within logic.
———
See “Propositional Logics for Three” by Tulenheimo and Venema in Dialogues, Logics And Other Strange Things by Cedric Degremont (Editor) College Publications 2008, for a generalized framework for logics with 3 quantifiers. Since the above logic requires either indexed domains or dependence operators, Яandom Logic is a bit different, but it is a good discussion.
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05.06.11
Posted in epistemology, independence friendly logic, logic at 5:52 pm by nogre
(∃x\∃x) → ∃x
Descartes Law
If something has informational dependence upon itself, then that thing exists. For example, thinking that you are thinking is informationally self dependent and therefore a thinking thing (you) exists.
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01.14.11
Posted in Frege, game theory, independence friendly logic, logic, philosophy at 8:24 pm by nogre
I was thinking that upside down A and backwards E were feeling lonely. Yes, ∀ and ∃ love each other very much, but they could really use a new friend. Introducing Angle I:
Now, Angle I, 
, is just like her friends ∀ and ∃. She can be used in a formula such as ∀x∃yz(Pxyz).
But how should we understand what is going on with the failure of the quantified tertium non datur? With that advent of a third quantifier, what’s to stop us from having a fourth, fifth or n quantifiers?
The Fregean tradition of quantifiers states that the upside down A means ‘for any” and the backwards E mean ‘there exists some’. So ‘∀x∃yPxy’ means ‘for any x, there exists some y, such that x and y are related by property P’. For instance we could say that for any rational number x there exists some other rational number y such that y=x/2.
If we, however, follow closer to the game-theoretic tradition of logic, then the quantifiers no longer need take on their traditional role. The two quantifiers act like players in a game, in which the object is to make the total statement true or false. In our above example, we would say that backwards E would win the game, because no matter what number upside down A picks, there is always some number that ∃ could find that is twice the number ∀ chose.
Under this view of quantifiers, quantifiers acting as players in a game, there is no reason why there can’t be any number of players. (Personally, I like the idea of continuing down the list of vowels: upside-down A, backwards E, angle I, then inverted O, O, maybe angle U? Go historical with Abelard, hEloise, and then Fulbert? Suggestions?)
Now, what is it good for? Let’s play a game of Agent Logic!
The purpose of a game of Agent Logic is to determine the loyalties of the agents in that game, i.e. discover any secret agents. A game consists of a particular logical situation, as given by formulae of independence friendly logic, with at least three different agents, each of which is represented by a quantifier: ∀, ∃, angle I, inverted O, etc. Each agent has an associated ‘domain’, and for the game to be non-trivial the intersection of the domains must have at least one element.
A game of Agent Logic is played by determining the information dependencies required to derive the target formulae from the premise formulae. Once the required information dependencies are known, then the strategies and loyalties of the agents have used may be inferred. The simplest solution to a game is one in which an information dependence indicates a loyalty: if an agent has access to certain information, then that agent must have a specific loyalty.
The person running the game is the Intelligence Director, given by the quantifier angle-I. This is you! All other agents are possible opposing Intelligence Directors or secret agents of the opposing Intelligence Directors. It is your job to figure out who has given who access to information and how that agent has acted upon it. Any information or strategy that is not derivable from the premises are considered acts of treason against you, the Intelligence Director. If the target premise (conclusion) is derivable from the premises alone, no determination of loyalty can be made.
The ‘domain’ of angle-I consists of what you depend upon, i.e. what you believe to exist and what you believe the other agent’s believe to exist. (Though it is a premise itself.) Recall that the backslash, \, means ‘is dependent upon’ and the forward slash, /, means ‘is independent of’.
premise:
1. \ (
∀\ (a, b, c),
∀/∃,
∃\ (a, b, c, d),
a, b, c, d
)
In this ‘domain’ of angle-I, the Intelligence Director is dependent upon ∀ depending upon the existence of a, b and c, and being independent of ∃, that ∃ depends on the existence of a, b, c and d, and the director herself depends upon the existence of a, b, c, and d.
premise:
2. ∀xPx
target (conclusion):
3. Pd
Now, since angle-I depends upon ∀ not depending upon d, there is no way to derive the target from the premises. However, since ∃ does depend upon d, if ∀ depends upon ∃, then agent ∀ has access to d.
Therefore, given treason,
4. ∀\ (∃\(d)) [premise of treason - ∀ receives information from ∃, specifically d ]
5. Pd [instantiation from 2, 4]
This shows that the conclusion can be reached if ∀ is treasonous, a secret agent of ∃, i.e. ∀ is loyal to ∃ and not angle-I.
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09.22.10
Posted in game theory, independence friendly logic, logic, philosophy at 4:08 pm by nogre
Rock Paper Scissors is a game in which 2 players each choose one of three options: either rock, paper or scissors. Then the players simultaneously reveal their choices. Rock beats scissors but loses to paper (rock smashes scissors); Paper beats rock and loses to scissors (paper covers rock); Scissors beats paper but loses to rock (scissors cut paper). This cyclical payoff scheme (Rock > Scissors, Scissors > Paper, Paper > Rock) can be represented by this rubric:
|
|
Child 2 |
|
|
rock |
paper |
scissors |
| Child 1 |
rock |
0,0 |
-1,1 |
1,-1 |
| paper |
1,-1 |
0,0 |
-1,1 |
| scissors |
-1,1 |
1,-1 |
0,0 |
.
(ref: Shor, Mikhael, “Rock Paper Scissors,” Dictionary of Game Theory Terms, Game Theory .net, <http://www.gametheory.net/dictionary/Games/RockPaperScissors.html> Web accessed: 22 September 2010)
However, if we want to describe the game of Rock Paper Scissors – not just the payoff scheme – how are we to do it?
Ordinary logics have no mechanism for representing simultaneous play. Therefore Rock Paper Scissors is problematic because there is no way to codify the simultaneous revelation of the players’ choices.
However, let’s treat the simultaneous revelation of the players’ choices as a device to prevent one player from knowing the choice of the other. If one player were to know the choice of the other, then that player would always have a winning strategy by selecting the option that beats the opponent’s selection. For example, if Player 1 knew (with absolute certainty) that Player 2 was going to play rock, then Player 1 would play paper, and similarly for the other options. Since certain knowledge of the opponent’s play trivializes and ruins the game, it is this knowledge that must be prevented.
Knowledge – or lack thereof – of moves can be represented within certain logics. Ordinarily all previous moves within logic are known, but if we declare certain moves to be independent from others, then those moves can be treated as unknown. This can be done in Independence Friendly Logic, which allows for explicit dependence relations to be stated.
So, let’s assume our 2 players, Abelard (∀) and Eloise (∃) each decide which of the three options he or she will play out of the Domain {r, p, s} . These decisions are made without knowledge of what the other has chosen, i.e. independently of each other.
∀x ∃y/∀x
This means that Abelard chooses a value for x first and then Eloise chooses a value for y. The /∀x next to y means that the choice of y is made independently from, without knowledge of the value of, x.
R-P-S: ∀x ∃y/∀x (Vxy)
The decisions are then evaluated according to V, which is some encoding of the above rubric like this:
| V: |
x=y → R-P-S |
& |
|
x=r & y=s → T |
& |
| x=r & y=p → F |
& |
| x=p & y=r → T |
& |
| x=p & y=s → F |
& |
| x=s & y=p → T |
& |
| x=s & y=r → F |
|
T means Abelard wins; F means Eloise wins. R-P-S means play more Rock Paper Scissors!
–
Johan van Benthem, Sujata Ghosh and Fenrong Liu put together a sophisticated and generalized logic for concurrent action:
http://www.illc.uva.nl/Publications/ResearchReports/PP-2007-26.text-Jun-2007.pdf
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05.04.10
Posted in game theory, independence friendly logic, logic, philosophy, science at 5:51 pm by nogre
Say we have some theory that we represent with a formula of logic. In part it looks like this:
[1] …(∃z) … Pz …
This says that at some point in the theory there is some object z that has property P.
After much hard work, we discover that the object z with property P can be described as the combination of two more fundamental objects w and v with properties R and S:
[2] …(∃z) … Pz … ⇒ …(∃w)(∃v) … (Rw & Sv)…
Now lets say that in our theory, any object that had property P depended upon some other objects, x and y:
[3] …(∀x)(∀y)…(∃z) … Pz …
In our revised theory we know that objects w and v must somehow depend upon x and y, but there are many more possible dependence patterns that two different objects can have as compared to z alone. Both w and v could depend upon x and y:
[4] …(∀x)(∀y)…(∃w)(∃v) … (Rw & Sv)…
However, let’s say that w depends on x but not y, and v depends on y but not x. Depending on the rest of the formula, it may be possible to rejigger the order of the quantifiers to reflect this, but maybe not. If we allow ourselves to declare dependencies and independencies, arbitrary patterns of dependence can be handled. The forward slash means to ignore the dependency of the listed quantified variable:
[5] …(∀x)(∀y)…(∃w/∀y) (∃v/∀x) … (Rw & Sv)…
Besides the convenience and being able to represent arbitrary dependence structures, I think there is another benefit for this use of the slash notation: theoretical continuity. In formula [2] above, there is a double right arrow which I used to represent the change from z to w and v, and P to R and S. However, I created this use of the double right arrow for this specific purpose; there is no way within normal logic to represent such a change. That is, there is no method to get from formula [3] to formula [4] or [5], even though there is supposed to be some sort of continuity between these formulas.
Insofar as the slash notation from Independence Friendly Logic allows us to drop in new quantified variables without restructuring the rest of the formula, we can use this process as a logical move like modus ponens (though, perhaps, not as truth preserving). Tentatively I’ll call it ‘Hypothesis Introduction’:
[6]
- …(∀x)(∀y)…(∃z) … Pz …
- …(∀x)(∀y)…(∃w/∀y) (∃v/∀x) … (Rw & Sv)… (HI [1])
The move from line one to line two changes the formula while providing a similar sort of continuity as used in deduction.
One potential application of this would be to Ramsey Sentences. With the addition of Hypothesis Introduction, we can generalize the Ramsey Sentence into, if you will, a Ramsey Lineage, which would chart the changes of one Ramsey Sentence to another, one theory to another.
A second application, and what got me thinking about this in the first place, was to game theory. When playing a game against an opponent, it is mostly best to assume that they are rational. What happens when the opponent does something apparently irrational? Either you can play as if they are irrational or you can ignore it and continue to play as if they hadn’t made such a move. By using Hypothesis Introduction to introduce a revision into the game structure, however, you can create a scenario that might reflect an alternate game that your opponent might be playing. In this way you can maintain your opponent’s rationality and explain the apparently irrational move as a rational move in a different game that is similar to the one you are playing. This alternate game could be treated as a branch off the original. The question would then be to discover who is playing the ‘real’ game – a question of information and research, not rationality.
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10.18.09
Posted in epistemology, game theory, logic, philosophy at 6:37 pm by nogre
In the Monty Hall Problem a contestant is given a choice between one of three doors, with a fabulous prize behind only one door. After the initial door is selected the host, Monty Hall, opens one of the other doors that does not reveal a prize. Then the contestant is given the option to switch his or her choice to the remaining door, or stick with the original selection. The question is whether it is better to stick or switch.
The answer is that it is better to switch because the probability of winning after switching is two out of three, whereas sticking with the original selection leaves the contestant with the original winning probability of one out of three. Why?
The trick to understanding why this occurs is to view the situation not from the contestant’s viewpoint, but from Monty Hall’s. At the outset, from Monty’s point of view, the contestant has a one out of three chance of guessing the correct door. In the likely situation (two out of three) that the contestant chose wrongly, Monty then has to know where the prize is among the two remaining doors in order to open a door that does not reveal the prize. So Monty opens a door not revealing the prize and asks the contestant whether he or she would like to switch or not.
However, the contestant knows that in the likely (two out of three) situation that the initial choice was wrong, Monty had to know where the prize was in order to open the door that did not contain the prize. Since the contestant knows that Monty has to know where the prize is to make the correct choice, the contestant can (in this likely case) place him or herself in Monty’s shoes. At this point Monty knows that the remaining door is the one that contains the prize, and hence the contestant should switch.
If we consider the unlikely situation in which the contestant initially chose the door with the prize behind it, then this line of reasoning will not work. Imagine that Monty forgets the location of the prize every time the contestant guesses correctly. In this situation he can still open either of the remaining doors without ever ruining the game. From his perspective the location of the prize is unrelated to his actions; it played no part in his decision to open one door or another (he merely chose a door the contestant hadn’t).
So, in the one out of three case where the contestant initially selected the correct door, there is no way to deduce whether switching is beneficial based upon placing oneself in Monty’s shoes: the situation where Monty has forgotten the prize’s location is indistinguishable from a situation in which he has not forgotten. Without any way to further analyze the situation and tilt the odds to over one out of three, the contestant should always assume that he or she is in the previous, more likely, situation and take the opportunity to switch.1
.
1Imagine that the contestant has a guardian angel that will let the game run its course if the contestant switches doors, but will change the location of the prize such that if the contestant sticks with the original door the angel will make sure that the contestant wins four out of five times. Then the probability of winning while switching will stay at 2/3 but the probability of winning while sticking will be 4/5. If the contestant had some way of divining that this was happening, this would be a case in which further analysis would be of benefit.
File translated from TEX by TTH, version 3.79.
On 13 Aug 2009, 13:48.
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01.23.09
Posted in argumentation, epistemology, logic, philosophy at 1:19 pm by nogre
Basic argument structure goes like this:
- Premise 1
- Premise 2
———————–
- Conclusion
Knowing how to argue is great, except when someone you disagree with is proving things you don’t like. In that case you have to know how to break your opponent’s argument or provide an argument that they cannot break.
First thing that most people do to break an argument is to attack premises (assuming no fallacies are present). To avoid accepting your opponent’s conclusion in line 3, if you can cast doubt on the truth of premise 1, then your opponent will never get to line 3.
Personally I think this sucks. I hate arguing about the truth of premises because many times people have no idea what the truth is and hold unbelievably stupid positions.
G. E. Moore argued that if the conclusion is more certain than the premises, then you can flip the argument:
- Conclusion
- Premise 2
———————–
- Premise 1
Instead of arguing about the truth of the premises, this strategy pits the premises against the conclusion by arguing that while the premises imply the conclusion, the conclusion also implies the premises. Hence there is a question about which should be used to prove the other, and, as long as this question remains, nothing is proved.
This leads to a kind of argument holism. An argument must first be judged on the relative certainties of its premises and conclusion before the premises can even be considered to be used to derive the conclusion.
Personally I think this is great. It is possible to just ignore whole arguments on the grounds that the person arguing hasn’t taken into account the relative certainties involved. If you haven’t ensured that your premises are more certain than your conclusion, then you can’t expect anyone to accept your conclusion based upon those premises.
However this leads to a nasty problem. If all arguments are subject to this sort of holism, then arguments can be reduced to their conclusions: if the whole argument is of equal certainty, i.e. the conclusion is just as certain as a premise, then there is no reason to bother with the premises. If we just deal with conclusions, and everyone is certain of their own conclusions, then arguing is useless.
(In practice, of course, only mostly useless. You can (try to) undermine someone’s argument by finding something more certain and incompatible with the conclusion in question (premises are always a good place to start looking). For better or worse, though, even when people’s premises have been destroyed, all too often they still are certain of their conclusions.)
Moreover, if everyone is certain of their conclusions, then no conclusion is any more certain than another. If everything has equal certainty, then nothing is certain.
How to get around this problem of equal certainty?
First let me mention that this is a strictly philosophical problem: in daily life we have greater certainty in some things than we do in others. For instance I trust certain people, and hence if they say something is true then I will be more certain of it’s truth than if someone else were to say the same thing. So fair warning: what comes next is a philosophical solution to a philosophical problem.
If something and its opposite are equally certain, then, generally, there is nothing more that we can know about it. For example if we know that it is either raining or not raining, then we really don’t know much about the weather. This applies in all cases, except for paradoxes. In a paradox something and its opposite imply each other. Hence, in a paradox, there is only one thing, not a thing and it’s negation.
Most the time paradoxes only shows us things that cannot exist. However, if what caused the paradox was the negation of something, then we can have certainty in that thing: it’s negation cannot exist on pain of paradox.
Therefore, to provided a rock solid foundation for an argument, a paradox must be appealed to such that the paradox must have been generated from the negation of the thing to be used as a premise.
As far as I can tell, this is the only argument structure that yields absolutely certain results. All other arguments styles are subject to questions about the truth of premises and the legitimacy of using those premises (even if true) for proving a particular conclusion.
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01.09.09
Posted in ethics, language, logic, metaphysics, ontology, philosophy, science at 1:04 pm by nogre
Truth is whatever you are willing to wager your sanity on. This works because sanity is relative to people, so if you are willing to wager your sanity on something, so should other people.
Deontology has a problem because no one can definitively tell you what it is to follow a rule. So deontologists can’t fault others for appealing to unexplained concepts without undermining their own argument.
Whereas the meanings of particular words may be conventional and subject to historical accident, there are distinctions that the words create that are not conventional. If logical operators are conventional, but must exist is every possible world (you must define the world using such operators), then conventional loses its meaning: it ceases to be a convention and is instead a necessity of the universe.
The concept of structure in ‘structural realism’ is ontological, causing problems for ontic structural realists. By calling the theory structural, structural realists are attempting to exploit the concepts associated with ‘structure’ from areas other than philosophy of science. This means that the term is not being used ontically because the concept of structure is taken to have real properties. So at every turn ontic structural realists are appealing to an ontological concept.
—–
oh and information aesthetics is back from break! woohoo!
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12.12.08
Posted in epistemology, logic, ontology, philosophy, preterphysics at 12:30 pm by nogre
Well, I guess this is it, the conclusion of this strange little saga which has been my foray into metaphysics. I get to go teach elementary school in rural Austria now. 2 whole pages in which you get to learn how to go from insanity to wisdom.
I have a final total version that contains the prologue and metaphysical ontology (slightly edited) here/ pdf. It’s just over 4 pages in length. I suspect I’ll edit some more and eventually I’ll have to do more with the middle section, but since it was the beginning and the end that really mattered to my current interests, I’m in no rush.
It is very odd completing everything you ever set out to complete (yes, it is a very good question why anyone should set out to write a new metaphysics and have no other plans). But I am happy I accomplished what I wanted. Truth is I never really thought I would.
1 Preterphysics
(Sometimes not everyone understands.)
Everyone has experienced misunderstanding: either you have been misunderstood, misunderstood someone else, or, more likely, both.
When some do not understand and others do, then there is something different between the two groups: one group recognizes something about the world or themselves that the other does not. It is this mutual recognition that allows for metaphysical agreement, and lack thereof for metaphysical disagreement.
To change metaphysical understanding means to recognize, discover or invent something that was not previously recognized, which likewise identifies a deficiency in the prior understanding. However, this means going outside of your prior metaphysics and thence the failure of ontological relativity.
With the denial of accepted metaphysics, some (if not all) things that everyone previously believed to exist will now be denied. The people who believe the prior metaphysics are excluded, at least initially, from understanding the new metaphysics and hence ontological relativity fails. The person who is denying the prior metaphysics may be considered insane by those that are excluded (which could be everyone).
Moreover, when ontological relativity is foregone, the denial of insanity is put into question. Making a unique claim is, at first, indistinguishable from nonsense because there is nothing comparable anyone else has ever said. If no one has ever made a similar claim then there is no way to tell whether you have become damaged, i.e. lost your mind, and if this claim is metaphysical, it can lead to changes in all other aspects of thinking. Therefore changing your metaphysics is done at the risk of going insane.
No one pulls something from the metaphysical vacuum without risking being pulled in themself.
Metaphysical research done with love discovers a new worldview in relation to responsiblity to others. Therefore, since others are included, it is possible to change your metaphysical position without the completele loss of ontological relativity.
If you love with respect to other people, then you need not fear new worldviews. Any change that you make will inherently have something in common with others, even if they do not yet recognize what you have recognized. Moreover, any inferior worldview will be apparent because it will be comparatively limited in ways to identify with others.
Without love having a fractured worldview with shattered responsibilities is possible. You can start to be worried when you are unsure of what your commitments to yourself are: if you are not commited to valuing your sanity, then you have lost your ability to deny insanity.
Metaphysical research done with force discovers a new logic in relation to the language of others. Therefore, since others are included, it is possible to change your metaphysical position without the completele loss of ontological relativity.
If you use force with respect to other people, then you need not fear new logic. Any change that you make will inherently have something in common with others, even if they do not yet recognize what you have recognized. Moreover, any inferior logic will be apparent because it will be comparatively limited in ways to change others.
Without force having a fractured logic with shattered language is possible. You can start to be worried when you are unsure of what your own words describe: if you cannot describe insanity, then you have lost your ability to deny it.
1.3 Creativity
Metaphysical research done with creativity discovers a new science in relation to other peoples’ view of nature. Therefore, since others are included, it is possible to change your metaphysical position without the completele loss of ontological relativity.
If you create with respect to other people, then you need not fear new science. Any change that you make will inherently have something in common with others, even if they do not yet recognize what you have recognized. Moreover, any inferior science will be apparent because it will be comparatively limited in ways to explore the world.
Without creativity having a fractured science with a shattered view of nature is possible. You can start to be worried when you are unsure of your own existence: if you cannot be sure of the existence of your sanity, then you cannot deny that you are insane.
2 Conclusion
If you have love, force and creativity then you are assured rationality even in unfamiliar territory. This means you have wisdom: the ability or skill to maintain and adapt your knowledge to future situations is called wisdom. Hence the greater love, force and creativity that you wield, the greater will be your wisdom.
Moreover, the basic metaphysics derived from the denial of insanity can now be built upon with confidence. Discipline is the foundation knowledge and wisdom is how we are able to extend it. If every distinction is made in such a way, then there will be no need to fear any argument.
File translated from TEX by TTH, version 3.79. On 11 Dec 2008, 14:42.
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11.10.08
Posted in art, epistemology, ethics, language, logic, metaphysics, mind, ontology, philosophy, preterphysics, science at 4:12 pm by nogre
What follows is the second part of my metaphysics, which includes the basic outline of just about everything in this world: nature, science, ethics, language and more. Again it is impossibly short, but the overall structure is correct, so you get a flavor of how I think about everything non-preterphysical.
————
1 Metaphysical Ontology
1.1 Undisciplined Substances
To be disciplined is to take other people’s ontological position into consideration. Since it is impossible, without being crazy, to do otherwise, what is meant by `undisciplined’ is the minimal position: to take other people’s ontological position into consideration as little as possible.
1.1.1 Objects, Processes and Nature
Objects cannot exists alone. To observe an object, to recognize its existence, requires observing some process that the object is part of. Rational beings can lose their rationality; the process of losing rationality identifies a rational being, because the process could not occur without the existence of one.
Objects and processes are what make up Nature.
1.1.2 Words, Descriptions and Language
Words cannot exist alone; they are inseparable from descriptions. For a word to exist is for that word to be part of some description. Without being part of a description, a word is indistinguishable from anything else.
Words and descriptions are what make up Language.
1.1.3 Commitments, Values and Responsibility
Commitments cannot exist alone; they are inseparable from values. Values are how commitments are ranked. Without values all commitments are equal, and hence non-existent.
Commitments and values are what make up Responsibility.
1.2 Disciplined Substances
When you take other people into consideration when considering substance, then you have disciplined substance.
1.2.1 Science, Art and Craft
When we describe objects and processes in a disciplined way then we are describing nature scientifically. This means that the objects and processes are described in a way that is not limited to a particular person or place.
Craft is a level of discipline that is not as universalized: when you describe nature such that it refers to a group of people or various places, then you are describing craft.
1.2.2 Grammar, Logic and Rhetoric
When we describe words and descriptions in a disciplined way then we are are talking about the language’s grammar. This means that the words and descriptions are described in a way that is not limited to a particular description. If we are describing features that all languages have, then this is called logic.
Rhetoric is a level of discipline that is not as universalized: when you describe grammar such that it refers to a group of words or descriptions, then you are describing rhetoric.
1.2.3 Ethics, Worldview and Society
When we describe commitments and values in a disciplined way then we are talking about ethical responsibilities. This means that the commitments and values are described in a way that is not limited to a particular person or place. If we are describing features that all ethics have then this is a worldview.
Society is a level of discipline that is not as universalized: when you describe ethics such that it refers to a group of commitments or values, then you are describing a society.
File translated from TEX by TTH, version 3.79. On 10 Nov 2008, 14:59.
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